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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES IN EAST 
ASIA AND PROSPECTS FOR
CO-OPERATION—A VIEW FROM EUROPE*
Frank Umbach*
Introduction
At the end of November 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a
still classiWed new directive for the American nuclear forces that
deWnes the potential use of nuclear weapons in conXict situations.
The new directive marks a departure from a nuclear strategy devel-
oped in 1981 under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan that called
to Wght an all-out, protracted nuclear war until victory, irrespective
of social and military costs. According to the new guidelines, the
future main purpose of U.S. nuclear forces will put the emphasis 
on deterring the use of nuclear arms or other mass destruction wea-
pons against U.S. forces or allies by threatening a devastating re-
sponse. These changes in the U.S. nuclear strategy have become
necessary because the future nuclear defence planning and targeting
requirements have to be reconciled with the denuclearization cuts of 
START–I and –II. Furthermore, these changes should encourage
the ratiWcation of START–II (which calls for reductions of nuclear
warheads from 6.000 to 3.000–3.500 on both sides) in the Russian
Duma.1 Nonetheless, the Clinton directive will preserve an retalia-
tion option of using nuclear strikes against military and civilian tar-
gets, if U.S. and allied armed forces are attacked particularly with
chemical or biological weapons. Therefore, the United States will
retain a triad of nuclear forces consisting of bombers, land-based
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-based missiles (SLBMs) but on lower
levels according to proposals of future START–III negotiations with
* Frank Umbach is a Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute of the
German Society for Foreign AVairs (DGAP) in Berlin. This analysis is based on
Wndings of a research project “Perspectives of Regional Security Co-operation in
the Asia-PaciWc Region”, sponsored by the Volkswagen foundation, at the DGAP.
1 To ambivalent Russian reactions see Dmitrii Gornostaev, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9
December 1997, p. 1 and Nikolai Zimin, Segodnya, 9 December 1997, pp. 1 and 4.
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2 The “Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons”, August 1996, can be obtained from the commission’s site on the World
Wide Web—http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.html.
3 George Lee Butler, “Time to End the Age of Nukes”, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March-April 1997, pp. 33–36 and “Statement on Nuclear Weapons (by
international Generals and Admirals)”, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1997, pp.
12–130.
4 B. Carnahan, “World Court Delivers Opinion on Legality of Nuclear Weapon
Use”, Arms Control Today (ACT), July 1996, p. 24.
5 J.W. De Villiers/Roger Jardine/Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up
the Bomb”, Foreign AVairs, November/December 1993, pp. 99–109.
Russia (after the Russian Parliament ratiWes START–II) that will
further downsize the nuclear arsenals to 2.500–2.000 warheads.
To some extent, this directive can be seen as a another indicator
for a creeping denuclearization and a diminishing role of U.S. nuclear
weapons in the context of their military planning for future conXicts.
Although the U.S. thus is maintaining a nuclear retaliation option
against ABC-weapons, simultaneously it will rely increasingly on the
use of conventional deep-strike, long-range high-precision weapon
systems, based on most modern technology, as it was already the
case in the Gulf-war in 1991. To some extent, these denucleariza-
tion trends seem also to be in line with a growing delegitimation of
nuclear weapons as calls for the abolition of all nuclear weapons and
a nuclear free world by the prestigious international Canberra Com-
mission2 and well-known retired U.S. oYcers such as General Lee
Butler (the former commander-in-chief of all U.S. strategic nuclear
forces) or General Andrew J. Goodpaster (former commander of
NATO forces in Europe) have shown.3 And although the International
Court of Justice’s ruling on nuclear weapons was quite ambiguous,
some activists of a nuclear free world felt be strengthened.4
Furthermore, they might also be encouraged by the fact that for-
mer forecasts of 20 nuclear powers by 1970 made in the 1960s by
U.S. experts have never become true. The number had reached nine
by 1990, including four undeclared nuclear powers (Israel, Pakistan,
India, and South Africa). In addition, shortly afterwards, South Africa
decided to dismantle its six nuclear bombs.5 Moreover, a horizontal
nuclear proliferation after the implosion of the former Soviet Union
(FSU) with new emerging nuclear powers on its territory (such as
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has been successfully prevented.
In contrast to these positive developments in the Weld of global
non-proliferation and denuclearization eVorts, however, a number of
other regional and global trends and their security implications put
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the goal of a nuclear free world in question, at least in near and
mid-term perspective:
The implosion of the nuclear superpower USSR and the result-
ing proliferation problems have created new potential proliferation
threats to both Europe and the Asia-PaciWc region. Although any
nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia seems nowadays more
remote than ever, Russia is facing numerous dismantling problems
and costs that aggravate problems of reforming its armed forces and
coping successfully with the challenges of the nuclear legacy of the
FSU. These challenges include the following two potential threats in
the near future: a) increasing risks of the loss of command and con-
trol over nuclear weapons, both politically and militarily, that might
lead to accidental or inadvertent and unsanctioned or unauthorised
use of them; and b) an illicit export of nuclear materials and exper-
tise to potential nuclear threshold countries.
Any proliferation of mass destruction weapons or even an unlim-
ited proliferation of advanced conventional weapon systems and the
increasing technology diVusion might fuel the already ongoing arms
build-up and arms competition in East Asia.6 It could lead to an
open arms race, increasing risks of misperception, miscalculation and
misunderstanding and Wnally to a violent outbreak of potential con-
Xicts, so undermining the stability and security in the region. Against
this background, new potential proliferation threats must be addressed
in the dynamic and highly Xuid security landscape of the Asia-PaciWc
region.
Although nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in the
South PaciWc—such as the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga (the South
PaciWc Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone or SPNWFZ) and Southeast Asia
(the 1995 South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone or SEAN-
WFZ),7 it remains an open question whether they are eVective instru-
ments for successful regional and global non-proliferation policies.
6 To the current regional arms build-up, technology diVusion and emerging mod-
ern defence industries in the Asia-PaciWc region see F. Umbach, “Strategic Changes
in the Asia-PaciWc Region: The Dimension of Military Technology DiVusion and
Proliferation of Advanced Conventional Weaponry”, in: Joachim Krause/Frank
Umbach (Eds.), Perspectives of Regional Security Co-operation in Asia-PaciWc: Learning from
Europe or Developing Indigenous Models? Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik (ed.
by the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign AVairs/DGAP), No.
100 (Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag GmbH, September 1998), pp. 43–69.
7 See “Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”, Strategic Digest
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Ultimately, they are dependent on the support of the nuclear weapon
states—the US, Russia, China, France and Great Britain—and their
national security interests.8 These interests are not always and exclu-
sively deWned by broader regional or global security concerns but
often to more narrow national security interests. Characteristically,
the support of the nuclear powers for these two nuclear-weapon-free
zones was and is still limited (SPNWFZ) or so far even non-existent
(SEANWFZ).9 Given European experiences, nuclear-weapon-free zones
might promote conWdence and security building measures (CSBMs),
but can hardly be the major or the only non-proliferation instru-
ment.10 Therefore, the analysis of motivations and the internal as
well as external security environment of potential nuclear threshold
countries remains an important prerequisite for deWning speciWc and
successful non-proliferation strategies.
Moreover, as the result of the dynamic economic growth and 
population increase in the Asia-PaciWc region, the energy demand
in the next decades will increase several times (particularly in China).
Given the limited existence of energy resources, almost all states in
East Asia are looking into the available options, notably the civilian
use of nuclear power. But the creation of new nuclear power sta-
tions, nuclear fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage and nuclear stor-
age sites will raise considerable non-proliferation concerns because
nuclear proliferation 69
3/1996, pp. 320–328. Although the treaty was drafted on the basis of similar agree-
ments, it has certain unique features such as the inclusion of the “Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs)” and continental shelves that has raised concerns particularly in the
United States and China. Thus far, both nuclear weapon states have not signed
the protocol of the SEANWFZ-treaty which ensures compliance with the treaty by
the Wve declared nuclear powers—to the background see Amitav Acharya/J.D.
Kenneth Boutin, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”, Security
Dialogue 2/1998, pp. 219–230 and Rolf Muetzenich, “KernwaVenfreiheit in Suedos-
tasien”, Aussenpolitik 4/1997, pp. 390–400.
8 See also Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assess-
ment”, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 18–32.
9 See also Keith Suter, “U.S. Signs on At Last”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March-April 1996, pp. 12–13.
10 Although one motivation of ASEAN states was to include EEZs and conti-
nental shelves to make sure that China cannot deploy nuclear weapons in or around
the contested islands and reefs in the South China Sea, this makes militarily little
sense given the capabilities of modern long-range weapon systems (particularly mis-
siles). Such zones can also lull their member states into a mistaken sense of nuclear
security. To their positive role in promoting CSBMs between its members see Ralph
A. Cossa, International Herald Tribune (IHT), 23 July 1996, p. 6. To an Indian critic
of such zones see Brahma Chellaney, IHT, 7 May 1996, p. 8.
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the boundaries between the civilian and military use of nuclear energy
are often small.11
Furthermore, new trends in Russia’s and China’s military policies
indicate either a greater reliance on nuclear weapons both for pres-
tige and compensating mounting deWciencies of its conventional forces
(as it is the case in Russia despite the denuclearization of the last years
as we will see later) or an accelerating modernisation process (as it
is the case in China). The latter might not only increase the accu-
racy of missiles and other technical parameter, but also expand its
current nuclear arsenal two or three times in the next 10–15 years.
Such a future nuclear arms build-up of China might also raise
and justify nuclear ambitions of other East Asian countries, notably
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (or a uniWed Korea after the col-
lapse of North Korea).12 Japan, for instance, is already confronted
by ambitions of two de facto and one potential nuclear power (Russia,
China and North Korea) in the Asia-PaciWc Rim. It might have a
direct or indirect impact on its security, particularly if the U.S. would
withdraw from the region or if the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a pos-
itive security guarantee for Japan would loose its credibility. More-
over, the Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race and their weaponry
programmes have also destabilising eVects on Southeast and North-
east Asian states because it threatens the crucial sea links for their
trade and energy Xows and undermines regional CSBMs.
The expansion of technology that has an dominant inXuence on
lives of most people presents certainly numerous beneWts and oppor-
tunities, but at the same time it poses also new security challenges.
The globalisation of economies and technology available provide new
opportunities for terrorists with a power of modern weaponry and
transnational links which are unprecedented in human experience.
The example of the AUM-Shinrikyo Doomsday Cult, which will be
analysed later in this paper, has underscored these grave hazards
with new dimensions.
11 These issues are discussed in the excellent paper by Hahnkyu Park, “Compre-
hensive Security and Regional Nuclear Co-operation in East Asia: The Case of
South Korea” in this volume.
12 On South Korea’s and Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions in the past see Andrew
Mack, “Potential, not Proliferation”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August
1997, pp. 48–53 and David Albright/Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare
Averted”, ibid., January/February 1998, pp. 54–60. A renewed open nuclearization
of Taiwan, however, might risk a pre-emptive military strike by the PRC.
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The following chapters do not aim primarily to identify the sta-
tus and numbers of nuclear weapons in East Asia13 but rather to
analyse some of the wider regional and global nuclear proliferation
challenges and nuclear modernisation eVorts in China which might
produce new security dilemmas in East Asia. It concludes with the
assumption that in order to prevent those new security dilemmas
and to stabilise and not to undermine regional and global stability,
a much broader and deeper security co-operation between nuclear
powers and non-nuclear weapon states is urgently needed in the
forthcoming months and years. Realistically, it should begin with
enhancing military transparency, such as publishing White Papers
with more detail information of the national defence policies, com-
paring military budgets, military doctrines and strategies, conven-
tional and nuclear arms procurement plans, and by inviting experts
to military exercises. While a wide-ranging and militarily signiWcant
nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia seems only achievable in a long-
term process of a nearly nuclear-free world, a register of nuclear
arms would contribute to more transparency and conWdence-building
in the region in the short—and mid-term perspective.
Proliferation Challenges of the Soviet Nuclear Legacy
and the Inherent Risks of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Armed
Forces
The Implosion of a Nuclear Superpower and its Proliferation Challenges
Although signiWcant steps toward a denuclearization and improving
the safeguards mechanisms of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal 
have been made during the last years, the implementation process
of START–II had to be extended from 2003 until the end of 2007.
It gives Russia more time to dismantle launch and delivery systems—
such as missile silos, bombers and submarines—with multiple war-
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13 Gerald Segal, “Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia”, in: Young Whan Kihl/Peter
Hayes (Ed.), Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula
(Armonk, NY-London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 305–317; Dunbar Lockwood, “The
Status of U.S., Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia”, in: ibid.,
pp. 318–358 and Ralph A. Cossa, “Nuclear Forces in the Far East: Status and
Implications”, in: ibid., pp. 359–380.
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heads. Moreover, Washington, therewith, hopes to win more sup-
port in the Russian Duma for the still un-ratiWed treaty as a pre-
condition for START–III negotiations.14
In the fall of 1993, the Russian minister for atomic energy, 
V. Mikhaylov, revealed for the Wrst time that the Soviet Union had in
1987 approximately 45.000 nuclear warheads in its arsenal15—12.000
more than the CIA had accounted in the mid of 1980s. In mid-
1993, the most reliable estimate, based on data from the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy
(MINATOM), speciWed the Russian nuclear legacy still on 32.000
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. 15.000 of them are active,
or deployed, and another 17.000 are in storage or awaiting dis-
assembly and disposal.16
Table 1: Reductions and Limits of Strategic Nuclear Warheads according to
START–I and –II
Mid 1991 START–I START–II
U.S.A. USSR/RF U.S.A. USSR/RF U.S.A. USSR/RF
ICBMs 2.450 6.612 1.444 3.258 500 795
SLBMs 5.760 2.804 3.456 1.744 1.728 1.744
Bomber 2.665 855 1.066 820 772 461
Total 10.875 10.271 5.966 5.687 3.500 3.000
Source: Frank Umbach, “Die nukleare Rüstungskontrollproblematik und die Rolle
der USA im postsowjetischen Raum”, in: BIOst (Ed.), Zwischen Krise und Konsolidierung.
Gefaehrdeter Systemwechsel im Osten Europas (Muenchen-Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1995),
pp. 360–371, here p. 360.
In the FSU, strategic nuclear weapons had only been deployed in
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Those weapons were all
either land-based ICBMs or weapon systems deployed on heavy
bombers. In contrast to the tactical nuclear weapons, their safety
against theft and unauthorised use had been perceived by Western
experts as rather high.
According to various Western and Soviet oYcial statements, 80–85
14 Steven Lee Myers, IHT, 29 September 1997, p. 6.
15 Moscow News 40/1993, 1 October 1993, p. 5.
16 ‘Nuclear Pursuits”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No. 4 (May) 1993, pp.
48–49; “Estimated Russian (CIS) Nuclear Stockpile ( July 1993)”, ibid., No. 6 ( July-
August) 1993, p. 57, and D. Lockwood, “Report on Soviet Arsenal Raises Questions,
Eyebrows”, ACT, No. 9 (Nov.) 1993, p. 23.
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per cent of the Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed within the
Russian Federation (RSFSR) itself, leaving some 4.000–6.500 war-
heads beyond the borders of the RSFSR. Confronted with disinte-
gration tendencies in the former Soviet Union at the end of 1980s,
the Soviet General StaV ordered already in the spring of 1990 to
withdraw the more numerous and more widely dispersed tactical
nuclear weapons from the potential conXict zones, particularly from
the Transcaucasus republics. The Soviet General StaV obviously
feared the possibility of “loosing nukes” despite of its numerous ex-
planations of its safeguarded tactical nuclear weapons against theft
or unauthorised use. However, Russia was not prepared for the rapid
withdrawal of thousands of nuclear weapons that it experienced.
Furthermore, not only nuclear weapons, but also the “nuclear
archipelago” with its research laboratories, weapon design bureau’s,
testing areas, the command, control, communication and intelligence
(C3I) facilities—like early warning radars—and production plants for
nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles as well as the nuclear com-
ponents, materials, and know-how have become a potential source
of concern for non-proliferation strategies. Thus the stockpile of Ws-
sionable materials, facilities and skilled bomb-builders pose a latent
problem of diversion to political factions, terrorists, or potential pro-
liferants around the world. Most of the facilities were located in the
Russian Republic, like the two nuclear weapon design laboratories
in “Arzamas-16” and Chelyabinsk-70. Hence all nuclear warheads
during the cold war had been exclusively produced within the Russian
republic. None of the other Soviet republics had facilities for design-
ing, manufacturing or refurbishing nuclear warheads. However, the
same cannot be said about the missile production and other parts
of the nuclear complex. The largest missile production facility, for
instance, was located at Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine. Moreover, the
underground test sites were located at Novaya Zemlya in arctic Russia
and in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). The last one was formally closed
by the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, on August
29, 1991.
Of particular importance for the future of the Russian strategic
nuclear forces are also the 11 early warning radars. Six of them were
located outside of Russia, in Skrunda (Latvia), Baranovichi (Belarus),
Mukatchevo and Sevastopol (Ukraine), Saryshagan (Kazakhstan) and
Lyaki (Azerbaijan). These early warning radar’s are needed in order
to maintain strategic stability (and to guarantee Russia’s second strike-
nuclear proliferation 73
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capability) because nuclear forces require numerous information as
well as command and control systems (C2). Because of the loss of
those early warning radar’s and the rapidly ageing C3I system, Russia’s
high command is now becoming partially blind—a fact that could
produce false alarms and makes adequate decisions both at the bot-
tom and the top of the high command as well as in the political
leadership much more diYcult.
Loss of Command and Control: Increasing Risks of an Unauthorised and
Unsanctioned Launch of Russia’s Nuclear Missiles17
During the Cold War, an unauthorised use of nuclear weapons
seemed largely a theoretical scenario without presenting a real threat
in peace times. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,
questions of command and control and “who has the nuclear but-
ton?” of the Soviet nuclear arsenal became utmost signiWcant when
the West insistently tried to Wnd out who was in possession of the
“nuclear briefcase”—thus during the August-putsch of 1991 and the
bloody events in October 1993 or in the early autumn of 1996,
when President Boris Yeltsin had been forced temporarily to give
up control over his country’s nuclear arsenal during a forthcoming
heart operation.18
Each nuclear command and control system is confronted with the
following dilemma: on the one hand, the system has to prevent an
unauthorised use of nuclear weapons—called “negative control”; on
the other hand, it has to guarantee the execution of an order to use
them after authorisation—called “positive control”. Both demands
interfere with each other. It confronts the military commanders with
the dilemma that measures which aim to reduce the risk of unde-
sired use make the execution of a release order for nuclear weapons
diYcult or even impossible. Or put it in other words: The more reli-
able the guarantee of a retaliatory strike becomes, the less reliable
is the guarantee against a non-sanctioned launch in event of error
17 On the following discussion see also the previous analysis by Frank Umbach,
“Who Controls the Nuclear Button?”, Jane’s Intelligence Review ( JIR), August 1992,
pp. 353–356, and idem, “Control and Security of Nuclear Weapons in the Former
USSR”, Aussenpolitik 4/1992, pp. 362–372. From the Russian side see in particular
the interview with the chief designer (pseudonym Yuri Nikolaev), Komsomol’skaya Pravda,
28 January 1992, p. 2.
18 See, for instance, Chrystia Freeland, Financial Times (FT), 13 September 1996.
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or overreaction to an imaginary threat. Measures that reduce the
risk of an unauthorised launch might thus impede the orders to exe-
cute an authorised retaliatory strike, and vice versa.
All nuclear powers are confronted by these dilemmas. But the pri-
orities and the speciWc concepts which the two superpowers placed
on measures to resolve them—particularly as to the delegation of
authority and devolution of top-down command and control—were
often very diVerent. But in the Cold War there was always on both
sides a certain tendency to give priority to positive rather than neg-
ative control. Consequently, during the coup d’Etat of 1991, Gorbachev
could not have been the only person at the most senior command
level who had custody of the “black briefcase” to release the access
codes for the use of the strategic nuclear potential.19 Furthermore,
the monopoly which the General StaV enjoyed in the control of
nuclear weapons was primarily designed to guard not against an
accidental launch but mainly against a failure not to respond to an
attack promptly and on a massive scale.
Since that time, three major negative factors aVecting Russia’s
Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) have been identiWed during the last
years: (1) the decline of the human support element in both num-
bers and reliability, partly also as the result of an excessive psycho-
logical strain, (2) the growing probability of technical failure as a
result of the ageing of nuclear warheads as well as of delivery sys-
tems, and (3) the current state of the ageing command, control, com-
munication and intelligence (C3I) system of the Strategic Nuclear
Forces. Many of those systems received practically no development
during the last years, are functioning in a reduced composition, are
degrading or have basically be stopped such as the work on improv-
ing Moscow’s anti-aircraft defence system.20
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19 Thus also the conclusion by Alexei Arbatov, “Taini yadernoi knopki. Nashi
generali mogut nacat’ atomnuyu voinu i ne sprosyas’ i prezidenta Rossii”, Novoe
Vremya 4/1992, pp. 28–31.
20 Viktor Surikov, Pravda-5, 10–11 September 1996, p. 3 and R. Bykov, Komsomol’skaya
Pravda, 15 March 1997, pp. 1–2. These facts have also been conWrmed by the (for-
mer) Russian defence minister Igor Rodionov himself in February 1997. According
to his alarming statement Russia’s nuclear missile forces are close to collapse because
of poor funding. Later, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin claimed again—in
contrast to Rodionov—the Wrm and eVective control of all nuclear weapons in
Russia—see Igor Korotchenko, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 February 1997, p. 1 and
Juriy Golotjuk, Segodnya, 22 February 1997, p. 1.
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All three factors have its negative implications for Russia’s main
wartime automated nuclear command-and-control system, called
“Kazbek”. It is the heart of Russia’s command and control system (as
a complex network of cables, radio signals, satellites and relays)
designed to authorise the launching of a nuclear strike after it caused
an alert in each of the three nuclear suitcases, called “Cheget”. This
Russian system is based on a “triple key system”21, involving the
Russian President, the Defence Minister and the Chief of the General
StaV who all possess their own set of codes. This technical and
administrative control of strategic nuclear weapons, however, was
and is ultimately dependent on the trust within the party-military
relationship or—being more concrete—on the absolute loyalty of the
General StaV oYcers to the political leadership of the FSU and
Russia. Meanwhile, this control system has eroded technically, Wnan-
cially and politically. Chronic budgetary shortfalls, worsening liv-
ing conditions, low pension and wages (if they are paid at all), gaps
in the early warning system and the maintenance of a “launch-and-
warning”-nuclear strategy (the ability to launch a retaliatory strike
before an attacking adversary’s warheads hit their targets) have all
contributed to increasing risks of erroneous, accidental or unautho-
rised missile launches because of technical failures, false warnings,
misjudgements or political and socio-economic reasons. These fac-
tors are particularly destabilising because Russia has a computerised
“doomsday” command-and-control complex, called “Perimetr”. Accord-
ing to the U.S. expert Bruce Blair, this system allows the General
StaV with its primary wartime post at Chekov (60 km south of Mos-
cow) to launch ICBMs directly, thereby by-passing subordinate 
commanders and missile launch crews, to insure quasi-automatic
retaliation in the event of a decapitation strike.22 At the same time,
21 See also Alexander A. Pikayev, “Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who Can
Push the Button?”, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, pp. 31–46, pp.
32V. and A. Konovalov/A. Sutiagin, “Nuclear Weapons on the Territories of the
CIS States: Problems of Safety and Security”, in: Joachim Krause (Ed.), Kern-
waVenverbreitung und internationaler Systemwandel. Neue Risiken und Gestaltungsmoeglichkeiten
(Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994), pp. 135–158.
22 Steven J. Zaloga, “Russia’s ‘Doomsday’ Machine”, JIR, February 1996, pp.
54–56; Bruce G. Blair, The New York Times, 8 October 1993, p. A35; id., “Global
Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp.
51–55. According to Russian sources, however, the involvement of the missile launch
crews is needed—see Valery Yarynych, The New York Times, 1 February 1994, p. A17
and the interview with Nikolai Devyanin (the chief designer of the Wrst modiWcation
of the president’s “suitcase”), “Is the ‘Nuclear Briefcase’ Really Necessary?”, Moscow
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the system has the technical capability that subordinate command
posts to launch their missiles automatically without approval from
Russia’s political leadership and the General StaV if they are dead
or unable to direct a nuclear retaliation strike.
Western eVorts towards co-operation on nuclear issues are still
hindered by the military’s reluctance for “glasnost” and an open dia-
logue about its command and control procedures and the current
status of the “Perimetr” system which is unknown. But considering
the loss of several early warning radars in the former Soviet republics,
the radar and satellite system is vulnerable because of gaps in its
network. Hence Western reluctance on the computerised “dead hand”
system remains and call in question the secure command and con-
trol (C2) over strategic nuclear weapons. Furthermore, U.S. intelli-
gence oYcials have pointed out in 1996 that the Russian “doomsday
machine” has only recently been deployed though the system has
been known for at least four years.23 Hence unthinkable scenarios
involving the unauthorised launch of nuclear weapons, particularly
in crisis, might not be excluded any longer.24
These uncertainties over command and control of Russia’s nuclear
arsenal and its “death hand” system had been highlighted in January
1995 when a Norwegian missile inadvertently alarmed Russia’s SNF
which triggered a heightened level of alert throughout its forces. It
was the Wrst time that President Boris Yeltsin declared to have used
his nuclear briefcase by activating the Kazbek-system in a real alert.
He speculated that Norway and NATO “might have been trying to
test Russia’s military readiness.”25 The General StaV, indeed, raised
the state of alert and combat readiness of Russia’s strategic triad so
that the whole command and control system was operating in com-
bat mode. But fortunately, the retaliation attack was not initiated
and the crisis ended. Later the Defence Ministry claimed to have
pursued the trajectory of the rocket from the beginning to its end,26
and Yeltsin dismissed his former comments as a misunderstanding.27
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News, No. 13, 1–7 April 1994, pp. 1 and 7. Nonetheless, I would follow here the
assumption of Bruce Blair because of a number of reasons which cannot be dis-
cussed here in detail.
23 James Adams, Sunday Times, 29 February 1996.
24 The Times, 28 July 1995.
25 Quoted in IHT, 27 January 1995, p. 2.
26 Marat Zubko, Izvestiya, 27 January 1995, p. 3 and Veronika Kutsyllo, Kommersant-
Daily, 27 January 1995, p. 1.
27 IHT, 27 January 1995, p. 2.
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Given the fact that Norway had informed the Russian side on 21
December 1994 of the rocket’s launch for studying the northern
lights phenomenon (like 607 other weather rockets before),28 how-
ever, the incident raised serious questions about the stability of Russia’s
strategic command and control system. A following investigation
found out that a prelaunch notiWcation message by the Norwegians
was not properly delivered to the Russian early warning forces.29
Characteristically for these uncertainties, a US report stated at the
end of 1996 that Russia’s SNF have implemented new procedures
to report accidental or unauthorised missile launches.30 It is, indeed,
this combination of domestic power struggles and bureaucratic poli-
cies for short-sighted political ends, of inaccurate information and of
misunderstanding, misperception or miscalculation that raises con-
cern, particularly in crisis, over Russia’s nuclear arsenal in general
and a secure information chain in particular from major military
installations to the supreme commander in chief of Russia that has
still the most formidable nuclear forces both in Europe and in Asia.
Moreover, nuclear weapons have become the last symbol of the
former superpower status in Russia. Together with the disastrous
state of Russia’s conventional armed forces, preparation for nuclear
war with the USA appears to remain a high priority for the Russian
military establishment and for deWning a new military doctrine and
nuclear strategy.
In order to strengthen “negative control” and to prevent any fur-
ther erosion of its command and control system, Russia has basi-
cally two options: (1) to lower the status of alert (de-alerting) of its
Strategic Nuclear Forces, and/or (2) to change the doctrine of its
national nuclear strategy and to reject all hair-trigger and accident
prone “launch-on-warning” postures of the Cold War on which Russia
traditionally relied on and which still dominates its nuclear control
system. Russia has taken only the Wrst choice and has reduced the
status of alert of its nuclear arsenal instead of favouring option two
or going even further (in co-operation with the United States) to an
end-state of zero alert—so-called “virtual arsenals” (disassembled
28 See also “Norway’s Ambassador Per Tresselt, Plays Down Rocket Incident”,
Moscow News, No. 5, 3–9 February 1995, p. 5.
29 David R. Markov, “The Russians and Their Nuclear Nukes”, Air Force Journal,
February 1997, pp. 40–43, esp. p. 43.
30 Ibid., p. 42.
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weapons under multilateral inspection and monitoring).31 The com-
plete mutual detargeting of all strategic missiles on 30 May 1994
was the result of the bilateral agreement signed by US President Bill
Clinton and Boris Yeltsin four months before. But it was rather a
political and symbolic step towards the West which has been reit-
erated by Yeltsin in May 1997 during his Paris visit.32 Militarily, this
information can be retargeted in minutes if not seconds. Thus the
agreement produced no signiWcant changes in the operational launch
readiness on both sides which are still regularly exercised.
Furthermore, Russia has dropped the pledge on its 1982 “no-Wrst
use”-policy of nuclear weapons in the document “Principle Guidance
on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” in November
1993.33 It has underlined the increasing role of Russia’s strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons in its defence policies.34 Many Russian secu-
rity and defence experts advocate placing a greater reliance on nuclear
weapons to compensate for the deWciencies of conventional forces.
Not only strategic nuclear weapons, but also tactical nuclear weapons
play a much more important role presently in Russia’s defence pos-
ture, and particularly in the Far East towards China. Aleksei Arbatov,
for instance, argued in 1997:
Chinese conventional build up greatly depends on massive imports of
weapons and technology from Russia. Thus, besides the nuclear threat,
Moscow has eVective means of undercutting or at least seriously slow-
ing down the emergence of this hypothetical threat. At a minimum,
to deter eVectively China’s conventional oVensive superiority at the
theatre, Russia might rely on the option of employing tactical nuclear
weapons in the border area to thwart the enemy’s oVensive operations
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31 On those proposals see Bruce Blair, “Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces”
and id., “Command, Control, and Warning for Virtual Arsenals”, in: Michael J.
Mazarr (Ed.), Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World. The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear
Arsenals (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 55–75, esp. pp. 62V.
32 On the confusing statement (as one of many others by Yeltsin) see the reac-
tion in the Russian press by Dmitrii Gornostaev, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 May 1997,
pp. 1–2 and Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya, 28 May 1997, p. 3.
33 The document in: Izvestiya, 18 November 1993, pp. 1–4. It has modiWed the
1982 Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (as a
denuclearized Ukraine)—see also Dunbar Lockwood, “Russia Revises Nuclear Policy,
Ends Soviet ‘No-First-Use’ Pledge”, ACT, December 1993, p. 19. The Russian
Minister of Defence, Army-General Pavel Grachev, declared it already in an arti-
cle four months earlier, see Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 June 1995, pp. 1 and 5.
34 See, inter alia, Vladimir Belous, “Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy”,
Security Dialogue 2/1997, pp. 159–171 and Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s Approach to
Nuclear Weapons”, The Washington Quarterly 3/1996, pp. 107–114.
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while deterring China’s nuclear response at the strategic level by supe-
rior (assured destruction) strategic retaliatory capabilities. Then Russia’s
deterrence would be credible: its nuclear capabilities would be suYcient
to deny China’s alleged military gains at the theatre but not threat-
ening to its national survival and thus would not provoke its strategic
nuclear pre-emption.35
The new emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons has also been
conWrmed in Russia’s newly declared “National Security Concept,”36
signed by President Boris Yeltsin on December 17, 1997, and in
new military doctrine and strategy proposals. It suggests an over-
whelming reliance on nuclear forces in a host of military-political
contingencies (including the right to use them as Wrst strike and some-
times even for the pre-emptive use in ethnopolitical conXicts) that
these forces cannot realistically and eVectively confront.37 Character-
istically for the increasing role of strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons—which mostly (at least 6.000 operational warheads plus
thousands in storage) have not been destroyed as former President
M. Gorbachev had pledged in October 1991—in Russia’s military
planning is also the fact that the current restructuring of Russia’s
armed forces is conducted under the slogan “military reform under
the nuclear missile umbrella.”38 Instead of improving living condi-
tions and raising the actual Wghting capacity of Russia’s conventional
troops engaged in peacemaking missions and internal conXicts, the
well-known Russian military expert and journalist Pavel Felgengauer
has criticised the current reforms with the words:
. . . money is being spent on superXuous nuclear missiles which, in
accordance with agreements on non-targeting, are aimed “nowhere”.
The fairy tale of the reform “under the nuclear umbrella”, the new
missiles and discussions on parity, will be paid for not only with money,
but also with the blood of Russian soldiers in future local conXicts in
this country’s southern regions.39
In this light, Russia places too much emphasis on nuclear scenarios
(which are mostly unrealistic and do not solve any of its most impor-
35 Aleksei G. Arbatov, “Virtual Arsenals”, in: Michael J. Mazarr (Ed.), Nuclear
Weapons in a Transformed World, pp. 319–336, here p. 331.
36 Kontseptsiya natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,
26 December 1997, pp. 4–5.
37 See also Aleksei G. Arbatov, “Voennaya reforma: doktrina, voiska, Wnansy”,
Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (MEiMO) 4/1997, pp. 5–21, here p. 8.
38 Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 23 October 1997, p. 1.
39 Pavel Felgengauer ibid.
Radtke/F5/66-133  3/9/00 1:29 PM  Page 80
tant security problems at its southern Xank) in order to justify its
declining world power status without having the means to control
them eVectively.
Moreover, regardless of the Duma’s ratiWcation of START–II in
the forthcoming months or years and the ongoing consolidation of
its nuclear armed forces (such as the integration of the Strategic
Missile Forces, the Missile Space Forces and the Missile Space Defence
Force into a single branch or the creation of a uniWed combat con-
trol system to provide centralised and stable control over all ele-
ments of the integrated Strategic Missile Forces),40 a decade from
now Russia probably will have less than 2.000 warheads in its strate-
gic nuclear arsenal as the result of the economic situation and its
scarce Wnancial resources it has to maintain its nuclear armed forces.
Even the core of its strategic nuclear deterrence forces, the Strategic
Missile Forces, will shrink dramatically in the years ahead.41 According
to Aleksei G. Arbatov, with the implementation of START–II, Russia
will not have more than 1.200–1.500 warheads in 2003 (the timetable
for the implementation of START–I has meanwhile be extended to
the end of 2007) because it is unable to deploy 700–1.000 additional
warheads and SS–25 missiles at a rate of 100–200 per year.42 At
the same time, however, thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear
warheads are still waiting in storages for their dismantling. Presently,
Russia has neither the Wnancial resources to maintain a nuclear arse-
nal equivalent to that of the United States nor suYcient funds for
dismantling all the nuclear warheads of the Cold War. Even the
ratiWed START–I agreement is only 40 per cent funded by Russia’s
federal budget.43
Moreover, with the ratiWcation of START–I and II and the Wnancial
pressure to downsize Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal, a radical
restructuring is under way with the result that most of Russia’s strate-
gic nuclear warheads in the future will be based on mobile–ICBMs
and SLBMs. Although these nuclear weapon systems will strengthen
the nuclear deterrence eVect (because they are more invulnerable
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40 Ilshat Maichurin/N. Poroskov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 November 1997, p. 1.
41 See also analyses by the Russian General StaV, reported by Dmitriy Gornostaev/
Andrei Korbut, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 December 1997, pp. 1–2 and Yevgeni Fedorov,
Kommersant, 20 January 1998, pp. 23–26.
42 Aleksei Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia. Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Pro-
spects”, International Security, Spring 1998, pp. 83–134, here p. 116f.
43 Yevgeni Fedorov, Kommersant, 20 January 1998, pp. 23–26.
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than silo-based ICBMs), simultaneously it will further weaken Russia’s
command and control safeguard system (because safeguards on
mobile—ICBMs and SLBMs on submarines are inferior to those on
silo-based ICBMs given communication problems and their vulner-
able links).44
Dismantlement Challenges and Problems of Denuclearization
Russia is facing a large-scale dismantlement of at least 27.000–28.000
nuclear warheads over the remaining years of 1990 and beyond,
regardless of its START–II ratiWcation. It includes warheads, mis-
siles, Wssile material and installations like missile silos.45 OYcially,
Russia is supposed to dismantle 9.200–9.450 tactical warheads which
included 5.000 nuclear artillery shells and mines, and warheads of
tactical missiles, 1.250 warheads of antiaircraft missiles, 1.200 war-
heads for carriers that were standard equipment of the navy, and
1.750–2.000 nuclear air bombs and missiles.46
In many respects, the dismantling process of mass destruction
weapons and their components is more challenging than construct-
ing them.47 According to the earliest START–II obligations in the
year 2000, more than 4.000 nuclear warheads will have to be scrapped
each year. Although the international community and in particular
the United States has been helpful by providing Wnancial aid, tech-
nical expertise and practical material aid (like transportation con-
tainers), these problems will remain on the international agenda for
many years to come:
Short-term attention is directed toward storage and transport prob-
lems of nuclear weapons as oYcials of MINATOM and the Russian
44 Bruce Blair, “Command, Control, and Warning for Virtual Arsenals”, p. 61.
45 Oleg A. Bukharin, “Meeting the Challenges of Dismantlement”, Transition, 17
November 1995, pp. 30–33, here p. 30.
46 Colonel Sergey A. Modestov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta-Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie,
16 May 1996, p. 6.
47 A good overview of the scale and costs of dismantling nuclear, chemical and
conventional weapon systems as a result of the arms control treaties for Russia and
the West is provided by Susanne Kopte/Michael Renner/Peter Wilke, “The Cost of
Disarmament: Dismantlement of Weapons and the Disposal of Military Surplus”,
The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1996, pp. 33–45. To the dismantling problems
themselves see Frank von Hippel/Marvin Miller/Harold Feiveson/Anatoli Diakov/
Franz Berkhout, “Verschrottung nuklearer Sprengkoepfe”, Spektrum der Wissenschaft,
October 1993, pp. 32–38, and Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Probleme nuklearer Abruestung:
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Defence Ministry have conWrmed.48 The process to withdraw strate-
gic nuclear warheads from the other interim nuclear successor states
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine Wnished at the end of 1996. But
many nuclear warheads have been stored in interim storage sites
before they can be moved to the central storage facilities. From there,
they will be transported to the MINATOM disassembly plants of
one of the closed cities where the warheads have been made. But
the withdrawals resulted in a shortage of Russia’s storage capacity,
compounded by the loss of almost 50 percent storage capabilities of
the FSU after the implosion of the USSR. Currently, Russia has no
more than 5–10 central storage locations,49 resulting in 17–120 per-
cent over capacity in the existing facilities in 1992 and 1993.50
Although Russia claimed to have a theoretical dismantlement capac-
ity of 5.000–6.000 warheads per year, it has never dismantled more
than 2.000–3.000 warheads during the last years.51 After the demise
of the FSU, reportedly only 500 experts capable of dismantling
nuclear warheads remained at work in 1992.52 But not only dis-
mantling nuclear warheads remain an economic, Wnancial, environ-
mental and security problem, but also the need to draw oV more
than 100.000 tonnes of highly toxic liquid missile fuel, which after-
wards has to be sent to factories in order to process it in a harm-
less environmental way.
Although Russia has dismantled some of its strategic nuclear arse-
nal faster than the United States despite all problems,53 there are
still about 1.200 metric tons of HEU (highly enriched uranium) and
150–200 metric tons of plutonium in various facilities throughout
the FSU which demand Russian and Western attention. Currently,
a huge nuclear storage site at the Mayak plant in the Urals is being
nuclear proliferation 83
Die Vernichtung von KernwaVen in der GUS”, Interne Studien und Berichte der Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Sankt Augustin, 45/1993.
48 See, for example, Rady Ilkayev/Boris Barkanov, “Safety of Nuclear Weapons:
An International Problem”, International AVairs (Moscow) 9/1994, pp. 23–27.
49 O. Bukharin, “Meeting the Challenges of Dismantlement”, p. 32. A. Surikov/
I. Sutyagin, “The Movement and Storage of Russian Nuclear Weapons”, JIR, May
1994, pp. 202–203 concluded that Russia has 8 central storage sites, so-called
‘Objects S’.
50 O.A. Bukharin, “Meeting the Challenges of Dismantlement”, p. 32. The most
probable level is being around 67 per cent—see A. Surikov/I. Sutyagin ibid. p. 203.
51 See also F. Umbach, “Das nukleare Erbe der militaerischen Supermacht
UdSSR—Part I”, Berichte des BIOst, No. 38, Cologne 1992, p. 12.
52 K. Belyanikov, Komsomol’skaya pravda, 4 February 1992, p. 3.
53 “U.S.-Russian Strategic Weapons Dismantlements”, ACT, May 1995, p. 32.
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built with US support which will contain not less than 40 per cent
of all Russia’s weapons-grade plutonium. Nonetheless, these prob-
lems of safe storage, transport and dismantling will remain on the
agenda also in the 21st century like the next ones.
The demise of the Soviet Union did not leave only a huge nuclear
complex and its infrastructure dispersed between almost all former
Soviet republics, but also a dangerous toxic legacy. The environ-
mental and radiation impact of at least 715 military tests of nuclear
weapons54 (and additional ones for civilian purposes) over 41 years
has already aVected past and present generations of people living
near those test sites or infrastructure facilities. The health damages
suVered will be felt also in the next generations and confront those
states with mounting health and social costs that they cannot aVord
in the foreseeable future.
By the year 2000, Russia has to decommission some 200 nuclear
submarines. 126 of them had already been decommissioned until
1995.55 Nonetheless, the naval infrastructure to handle the nuclear
waste was unable to keep up with the original retirement of nuclear
submarines, not to speak about the additional decommission of nuclear
submarines as result of the nuclear arms control treaties. In 1993,
Russia was using a total of 235 ships equipped with a total of 407
nuclear reactors, which was 60 per cent of the total number on all
the world’s ships with nuclear reactors. In the process of their oper-
ation, up to 20.000 cum of liquid radioactive wastes and 6.000 tons
of solid wastes had been generated annually.56 Today, some 120–150
nuclear-powered submarines are rusting in the Northern Fleet and
Far East as “potential Chernobyls”.57 In 1993, 67 of Russia’s 109
nuclear submarines were based in Murmansk.58 The Northern Fleet,
Russia’s largest, has 279 nuclear reactors (18 per cent of the world’s
54 See also David HoVmann, IHT, 28 October 1996, p. 1.
55 See also Douglas L. Clarke, “Naval Nuclear Waste Poses Immense Risk”,
Transition, 17 November 1995, pp. 34–38, here p. 34 and Joshua Handler, “Russia’s
PaciWc Fleet—Problems with Nuclear Waste”, JIR, March 1995, pp. 136–140. To
the radioactive pollution of the oceans see Alexander Koldobskij, “Zur radioaktiven
Verschmutzung der Meere und Ozeane”, Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift (OeMZ )
6/1994, pp. 625–632 and Tomas Ries, “The Nordic Region and Post-Soviet
Radioactive Pollution”, JIR, September 1993, pp. 398–400.
56 Andrei Baiduzhy, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 April 1993, p. 1.
57 T.B. Cochran/R.S. Norris/O.A. Bukharin, “Making the Russian Bomb”, 
p. 238 and Doug Clarke, OMRI Daily Digest, 29 September 1995.
58 On the situation of the Northern Fleet and Murmansk see the article by
Vladimir Kucherenko, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 May 1996, pp. 1–2 and Joshua Handler,
“The Northern Fleet’s Nuclear Submarine Bases”, JIR, December 1993, pp. 551–556.
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total),59 including nuclear ice-breakers. Regular overhauls of active
submarines have been suspended and crews are inadequately trained
to maintain and operate the reactors due to failing resources. Current
plans to decommission and dismantle 88 nuclear submarines are also
hampered by high costs. In addition, at least ninety reactors are
reportedly stored under “unsafe conditions”. Ten of the submarines
have defective reactors, which could sink at any moment, leading to
“an ecological disaster”, according to Admiral Oleg Yerefeev, com-
mander of the Northern Sea Fleet.60
Furthermore, Russia’s Northern and PaciWc Fleet have accumu-
lated 30.000 fuel cells weighing 535 tons in substandard temporary
storage facilities. Reportedly, but unconWrmed, one nuclear subma-
rine, called K–219, which sank in the Atlantic Ocean 600 miles east
of Bermuda in October 1986 broke open in 1996 and unknown
amounts of radioactive plutonium from its carried 32 nuclear war-
heads are now spilling into the Ocean.61
Environmental concerns arise particularly from the dumped reac-
tors near the military closed island of Novaya Zemlya and in the
PaciWc. Since 1965, at least 20 reactors, seven of them are still of
spent fuel, had been dumped of Russia’s Arctic and PaciWc coasts
in violation of international treaties, lying to the International Mari-
time Organisation which enforces them. Norwegian experts estimate
that 8.000 cubic metres of radioactive liquid waste in storage of the
Northern Fleet might contaminate the whole Barents Sea or leak
into the ground.62
OYcially, since October 1993, all dumping of liquid and solid
radioactive waste by the Russian navy has ceased. Although Japan,
which is—with the bitter experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—
in particular concerned about sunken reactors and suspected ongo-
ing dumping of liquid nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan,63 has oVered
numerous aid, the Russian military seems to continue the dumping
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59 Matthew Kaminski, FT, 21 August 1996, p. 2.
60 Penny Morvant, OMRI Daily Digest, 19 September 1995.
61 The Korean Herald (TKH), 26 November 1996, p. 1.
62 See Douglas L. Clarke, “Naval Nuclear Waste Poses Immense Risk”, Joshua
Handler, “Russia’s PaciWc Fleet—Problems with Nuclear Waste”, Alexander Koldobskij,
“Zur radioaktiven Verschmutzung der Meere und Ozeane”, Tomas Ries, “The
Nordic Region and Post-Soviet Radioactive Pollution”, all quoted above.
63 See also Igor Ryabov, “To be Consumed on the Promises”, New Times, 45/1993,
pp. 26–27; Shinjiro Mori, “The ‘Black Cat’ EVect”, ibid., p. 27 and Sergei Agafonov,
Izvestiya, 13 May 1993, p. 3.
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of nuclear fuel and munitions into the ocean because all their stor-
age facilities are full.64 Japan’s oVer includes building a radioactive-
waste storage and reprocessing plant in Primorski Krai with a capacity
to process 5.000–7.000 metric tons of waste per year,65 and addi-
tional joint inquiries to Wnd solutions.
Dangers of an Illicit Export of Nuclear Material       
and Expertise
Another proliferation challenge of Russia’s nuclear legacy represents
is the theft of nuclear material. Given the fact that the nuclear infra-
structure was distributed over the entire territory of the FSU, all
nuclear successor states have faced diYculties in managing nuclear
weapon-related components on their territories. But nowhere else
than in Russia has the scope of problems such great dimensions.
The proliferation concerns in the West are therefore not only directed
toward nuclear weapons but also toward hundreds of tonnes of
nuclear material suitable for nuclear weapon manufacture.66 The
arms control processes of START–I and –II and their envisaged dis-
mantling of thousands of nuclear weapons, including their warheads,
have aggravated that problem. Russia will be left holding tens of
thousands of containers of Wssile materials in above-ground storage
sites for many years to come. This problem has been compounded
by the fact that in the FSU no Wssile material control and account-
ing system existed. No one knows exactly how much nuclear mate-
rials they have in their store sites or other nuclear facilities. In most
sites they do not even know if any nuclear material is missing. In
that context, Western assistance programmes focus on three elements:
(1) physical protection (barriers, sensors, and other technologies to
64 See, for instance, Sergei Agafonov, Izvestiya, 15 February 1995, p. 3. On the
storage problems of nuclear fuel in the Russian navy see D.L. Clarke, “Naval
Nuclear Waste Poses Immense Risk”, p. 36f.
65 A contract has been signed for a Xoating nuclear waste recycling vessel with
a number of Japanese and U.S. companies, funded by the Japanese government as
part of its 1993 aid programme to support Russia’s nuclear disarmament, in January
1996—see Doug Clarke, OMRI Daily Digest, 15 January 1996 and Penny Morvant,
ibid., 8 February 1996.
66 See also Oleg Bukharin, “Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet
Union”, Survival, Winter 1994–95, pp. 53–72, and John P. Holdren, “Reducing the
Theft of Nuclear Theft in the Former Soviet Union”, ACT, March 1996, pp. 14–20.
Radtke/F5/66-133  3/9/00 1:29 PM  Page 86
prevent access to the nuclear material); (2) material control and (3)
material accounting. The two materials of primary concern are HEU
and plutonium.67
The situation in the FSR has been aggravated by (1) the lack of
nuclear safeguard expertise, (2) the ineYciency of border controls of
the new independent successor states of the FSU, (3) failing or
insuYcient export control legislation and implementation in most of
the FSR, (4) civil turmoil in some of them and (5) the frustrating
economic situation which leads to crime and corruption as a mat-
ter of life in all FSR.68 Unless the agreed international safeguards
are not implemented, civilian nuclear facilities can lose nuclear mate-
rial suitable for weapons to the black market. The material can be
used by nuclear threshold countries, “rogue states” or even terrorists.
While the general discussion during the Wrst years after the demise
of the FSU focused on the question of whether the Russian gov-
ernment has control of nuclear weapons, the U.S. intelligence com-
munity is presently fearing that Russia might be losing control over
the large and widely dispersed stores of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium. Its ability to enforce export control measures remains prob-
lematic because of resource shortages, weak customs enforcement,
institutional decay and widespread corruption and crime in all parts
of the society, including in its armed forces.69 Without Western
Wnancial resources and support, “our nuclear specialists and their col-
leagues will never be able to prevent thefts and leaks from ‘reliable
sources’”, as a Russian conference report concluded in March 1996.70
Meanwhile, 80 per cent of Russia’s nuclear-technical security system
is maintained “with American money” as was admitted by another
Russian source in September 1997.71 These problems of safe stor-
age, transport and dismantling will not be resolved in the near future
but remain on the international agenda of the 21st century.
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67 See also Joachim Krause/Erwin Haeckel, “Auf dem Weg zur nuklearen Anarchie?
Die mangelhafte Sicherheit waVenfaehiger Spaltmaterialien in Rußland und der
GUS”, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik (ed. by the Research Institute of the
German Society for Foreign AVairs/DGAP), No. 99 (Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag,
April 1998).
68 “Proliferation and the former Soviet Union” (Washington D.C.: Congress of
the United States/OYce of Technology Assessment, 1994), p. 23.
69 On a Russian source conWrming these analyses see Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 30,
July 1997, p. 2. According to this report almost 70 per cent of the technical means
employed to protect nuclear installations are obsolete.
70 Anton TroWmov, Segodnya, 17 March 1996, p. 1 and 7.
71 Andrei Korbut, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 September 1997, p. 1.
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Successful non-proliferation strategies do not only have to keep
strict control over nuclear weapons, Wssile material and other nuclear
components, but also to prevent the proliferation of know-how. The
collapse of the greatest nuclear power and its infrastructure in the
world has also raised concerns that a nuclear “brain drain” to nuclear
threshold countries or “rogue states” (like Libya, Iraq, North Korea)
could provide them with a desired critical knowledge to build up
their own nuclear weapons and include them in their military 
arsenals.
In November 1991, a Japanese newspaper published for the Wrst
time a list of ten secret cities that were previously unknown and
appeared on no map of the former Soviet Union (FSU).72 But it was
only the tip of an iceberg, although the numbers of cities and their
population are still oYcially secret. Altogether, more than 87 cities
and centres have been exclusively built for nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons production (including all of the defence ministry’s
missile and weapon-design plants).73 Approximately one million peo-
ple lived and worked alone in the nuclear “nuclear archipelago”. Of
those, 100.000 people were employed in the nuclear weapon pro-
grammes of whom 10.000–15.000 had access to classiWed informa-
tion; 2.000–3.000 had a detailed knowledge of weapon design and
held top-secret information. In addition, 3.000–5.000 worked at a
high-know level in the production of Wssile material.74 But only
100–200 people had the full knowledge about design, development,
manufacture and Welding nuclear weapons enabling them to man-
age and overview a nuclear weapon programme.75 These 10.–15.000
people with access to critical information constitute a “state secret”
in the Russian view. They worked in Russia’s closed cities where it
was prohibited to leave the country or even the city without having
any special permit. Furthermore, until 1991 they had only very lim-
ited information and contact with the “outer world”, including con-
tact with their neighbouring regions inside their own country. At
that time, the KGB functioned as an eYcient watchdog which guar-
anteed the tightening security of those cities. Moreover, elitism and
72 Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 November 1991.
73 “Russia’s Secret Cities”, The Economist, 25 December 1993.
74 See the interview with V. Mikhaylov, Komsomol’skaya pravda, 31 January 1992,
p. 1; id., Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 May 1992, p. 4.
75 See the interview with Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, “Redirecting the Soviet
Weapons Establishment”, ACT, No. 5 ( June) 1992, pp. 3–6, here p. 5f.
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secrecy have always characterised the people working in the nuclear
weapon complex which nowadays has become rather a burden for
them when having to accept the new and harsh socio-economic 
realities.
The collapse of the USSR and the loss of many privileges and
social security standards has upset the future of the “nuclear archi-
pelago” as well as the personal life of ten thousands of people liv-
ing inside this nuclear complex.76 The rising unemployment among
engineers, technicians, and scientists as the result of deep cuts in gov-
ernment spending have reduced the demand for specialists. The 
former pride of Russia’s nuclear elite has thus become a social and
political burden.77 Moreover, estimates predicted that 1.5 million
highly qualiWed specialists from the FSU could leave the country by
the end of this century. This would certainly result in a major loss
of Russia’s scientiWc potential, and ultimately damage its economic
recovery. But thus far, it seems, that the internal brain drain and
emigration (leaving the military-industrial complex but remaining in
the country) and buying cheap labour represents the major problem
for Russia, rather than a brain drain of nuclear experts leaving for
abroad.78
In the past few years, however, the economic situation of the
nuclear complex has further deteriorated. In 1993, nuclear weapon
scientists threatened Russia’s government with strikes and stopping
the process of dismantling nuclear weapons for the Wrst time in their
history. Their salary was decreasing, former beneWts have been stopped
and their payment had been delayed up to two months (which is
not a speciWc problem of that elite but rather commonplace) while
the amount of work has drastically increased.79 In November 1994,
a new special status has been established80 that regulates the leaving
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76 The suicide of Vladimir Nechai, director of the All-Russian Research Institute of
Technical Physics, part of Russia’s nuclear weapons laboratory Chelyabinsk-70, in
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West—see David HoVmann, IHT, 24–25 December 1996, p. 5.
77 See the roundtable discussion in, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 July 1993.
78 R. Adam Moody, “Reexamining Brain Drain From the Former Soviet Union”,
The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, pp. 92–97, here p. 93.
79 Vladimir Gubarev, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 23 June 1993.
80 The new status is based on the liberalised “Law on the Procedures of Exit from the
USSR and Entry to the USSR for Citizens of the USSR” on 30 May 1991. The law en-
tered into force on 1 January 1993. It prevents anyone with access to state secrets
from emigration for at least Wve years (with the possibility of extension)—see 
R. Adam Moody, “Reexamining Brain Drain From the Former Soviet Union”, p. 92.
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of the renewed closed cities. But it also highlighted the growing
inXuence of the military-industrial complex81 and the increasing dis-
appointment of U.S. promises of funds which had not been fulWlled
until 1994/95.82 Nonetheless, the development of the nuclear com-
plex under the new circumstances and deteriorating conditions is not
so much an industrial or technical problem as a political one. That
fact is highlighted in new disturbing trends in Russia that in a period
when the Russian Air Force is allowed to overXy American terri-
tory, Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin signed several decrees in 1996
and 1997 to close once more some of the opened cities (which for-
merly belonged to the so-called “closed cities”).83
Against the brain drain challenge, the United States and Russia
agreed in February 1992 to establish an international centre to pre-
vent a migration of Russian nuclear experts to nuclear threshold
countries or “rogue states”.84 Funds have been committed to the
“International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC)” by the United
States, EU, Japan, Sweden, Canada and Switzerland and other sup-
port aid such as Nato’s Science programme. But it took more than
two years before the ISTC could begin its operation in March 1994,
because of bureaucratic inertia in the West and suspicion on the
Russian side by MINATOM and ministry of defence oYcials. A sim-
ilar centre had been established in Kiev in 1994. But the ISTC—
programmes have faced a lot of problems. Nonetheless, these centres
have initiated a variety of lab-to-lab programmes, employing thou-
sands of former Soviet weapon scientists in useful civilian work. In
April 1996, about 236 ISTC project proposals have been initiated
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia which spon-
sor about 12.500 scientists for up to three years.85 But thousands
more are still working in Russia’s nuclear complex under diYcult
conditions or remain unemployed. Moreover, most of Russia’s con-
81 Elena Viktorova, Segodnya, 12 November 1994 and Aleksandr Batygin, Rossiiskaya
Gazeta, 24 November 1994.
82 Der Spiegel 24/1994, pp. 174 and 176.
83 Paul Goble, “A Past Too Much With Us”, RFE/RL Analysis from Washington,
6 August 1997.
84 IHT, 18 February 1992, pp. 1–2 and “International Centre to Limit Brain
Drain”, ACT, March 1992, p. 24.
85 Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union. Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status
Report, (Washington D.C. and Moscow: The Monterey Institute of International
Studies/The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Monterey, 1996), No.
4, p. 57.
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version programmes have either never been implemented or proved
to be successful in establishing substantial new commercial business
in the nuclear cities.
Meanwhile, as some Western and Russian experts have pointed
out, a new dimension of the brain drain problem has been emerged
out of the blue as a result of globalisation and the widespread avail-
ability of modern communication technologies. In the age of Internet,
it seems often no longer necessary for nuclear experts to leave their
country and go abroad to be involved in some clandestine nuclear
programmes or to solve speciWc weapon programmes of nuclear
threshold or “rogue states”. Many other Western experts, however,
remain sceptical about this new dimension, stating that Internet is
suYciently monitored by Western non-proliferation as well as intel-
ligence experts, and that many problems in developing nuclear
weapons have to be solved in those secret facilities themselves.
Nonetheless, as we will see later in the case of AUM Shinrikyo, the
problem of the future brain drain challenge might be discussed in
terms of preventing the transmission of knowledge and expertise via
Internet and international computer lines rather than in the context
experts emigrating abroad.
North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions
North Korea’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons and its sus-
tained ballistic missile programmes are perceived as the most acute
threat to regional security and stability in East Asia.86 Western experts
fear that a failure to manage the crisis on the Korean Peninsula
could trigger nationalist sentiments in neighbouring states and else-
where. This could lead, for instance, to a militarisation of Japan’s
foreign policy and weaken its opposition to nuclear weapons. Hence
the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula has not only direct secu-
rity impacts on both Korean states but also indirect implications for
the stability of the entire Asia-PaciWc region because it might pres-
sure other Asian states—notably South Korea, Japan and Taiwan—
to rethink their current non-nuclear status.
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Following pressure of the former Soviet Union and its oVer to
build a nuclear power plant, North Korea joined the NPT (Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty) on 12 December 1985. But it took seven years
before it Wnally signed the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
agreements on 30 January 1992 with a subsequent ratiWcation on 
9 April 1992. Already in December 1991, both Korean states signed
a historic agreement (“Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula”) to ban all nuclear weapons on the Korean
peninsula. That agreement became possible because U.S. president
George Bush had announced a series of unilateral U.S. nuclear ini-
tiatives in September 1991. They included the world wide withdrawal
and destruction of all ground-launched theatre and sea-based tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, including those on the Korean Peninsula.87 But
the agreement of December 1991 has never been implemented, due
to disagreements over important modalities such as veriWcation meas-
ures and the necessity for “challenge inspections” of any suspicious
site on the other’s territory, whether declared or not, at short notice.88
Furthermore, in February 1993 it stopped all IAEA inspections of
its nuclear sites and decided unilaterally on 12 March 1993 to with-
draw from the NPT.
10 years earlier, by analysing the Arab–Israeli War in 1973, the
North Korean leadership became convinced that ballistic missiles 
will play a fundamental role in future warfare. According to Valeri
I. Denisov, deputy director for Asian aVairs at the Russian Foreign
Ministry, the FSU opposed a North Korean plan to launch a war
against South Korea in 1975.89 Thereupon, North Korea discarded
the plan, but initiated indigenous missile programmes with the sup-
port of Russian and Chinese experts and technologies.90 In order to
speed up those weaponry programmes, North Korea also purchased
a small number of “Scud–B” missiles from Egypt. Despite experi-
encing signiWcant problems in their missile programmes, North Korea
Wnally conducted its Wrst modiWed Scud–B missile test in April 1984.
According to US and South Korean sources, North Korea possesses
presently around 500 “Scud” missiles with ranges up to 500 km in
87 Peter Hayes, “The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance”, in: Young Whan Kihl/
Peter Hayes (Ed.), Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, pp. 240–268, here pp. 259–261.
88 Seo-Hang-Lee, “Denuclearization EVorts on the Korean Peninsula”, in: Péricles
Gasparini/Daiana Belinda Cipollone, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century
(UNIDIR/United Nations: New York-Geneva 1997), pp. 99–101, here p. 99f.
89 TKH, 23 July 1996, p. 1.
90 On Russia’s assistance see Novie Izvestiya, 5 November 1997, p. 2.
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addition to 450 Frog artillery rockets. Pyongyang can mass produce
those missiles at a rate of one hundred per year.91
While North Korea’s economy is collapsing, Pyongyang is eco-
nomically more and more incapable of supporting one of the biggest
conventional armies in the world. South Korea, by contrast, can
both limit its defence burden and simultaneously modernise its con-
ventional forces by raising the quality that ultimately might balance
oV the quantitative superiority of its Northern opponent. By 1992,
hard-liners in the North Korean regime might have argued that
those trends combined with its loss of Soviet/Russian as well as
Chinese support and their security umbrellas leaves only one option:
to resume (or accelerate) eVorts to develop a more eVective nuclear
deterrent capability as a compensation for the former close alliance
with both communist powers.92 Consequently, in June 1990 and May
1993 North Korea tested successfully its new mobile ballistic missile,
the Nodong–1, over the Sea of Japan. The Nodong–1 was based on
Scud–B and –C technologies and North Korea’s own development
programmes. It is a completely redesigned system that covers with
its range of 1.000–1.300 km not only the entire Korean Peninsula
but also Japanese cities such as Niigata and Osaka. The full-scale
production begun in 1991. Although this enlarged Soviet Scud-
missile has only a poor accuracy, it is also more diYcult to intercept.
In October 1996, the United States had to press North Korea not
to test Wre a Nodong–I ballistic missile into seas just oV the Japanese
coast.93 At the end of 1997, U.S. and Japanese intelligence sources
reported that the missile has either already been deployed or is at
least in an advanced stage of development, including preparing 
for test Xights. Thereupon, the U.S. Air Force has deployed special
RC–135s reconnaissance aircraft (code named the “Cobra-Bell”) in
Japan for daily Xights that cost over 100.000 US$ a day. Given the
fact that the U.S. Air Force has reportedly only three of those spy
planes, it is widely believed that the Pentagon only deploys them
when it has solid signs of an imminent launch of ballistic missiles.94
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December 1996, pp. 560–564, here p. 561.
92 Mel Gurtov, “South Korea’s Foreign Policy and Future Security: Implications
of the Nuclear Stand-oV ”, PaciWc AVairs, 1 (Spring) 1996, pp. 8–31, here p. 12.
93 TKH, 17 and 19 October 1996, p. 1.
94 Asian Defence Journal (ADJ) 11/1997, p. 68 and Jane’s Intelligence Review & Jane’s
Sentinel Pointer, December 1997, p. 10.
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Furthermore, North Korea is also reportedly working on the capa-
bility to equip the Nodong–1 as well as the longer-range ballistic mis-
siles Nodong–2, Taepo-Dong–1 (range 2.000 km) and Taepo-Dong–2
(range at least 3.500 km) with nuclear, chemical and biological war-
heads.95 Against this background, North Korea’s Taepo-Dong–1 mis-
sile test on 31 August 1998 over Japan shocked the world and has
threatened regional and global non-proliferation policies.96 When the
multi-staged Taepo-Dong–1 missile was launched on 31 August 1998
100 km south of the port city of Ch’ongjin and Xew across the Sea
of Japan in a new game of dangerous brinkmanship, North Korea’s
explanation that it had launched a satellite, not a missile over Japan
caused confusion and surprise.97 Regardless of whether the missile
carried a satellite or not, it demonstrated that Japan is within range
of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, and that North Korea has made
considerable progress in mastering technical obstacles of multi-staged
long-range ballistic missiles whose range and capability caused sur-
prise even in U.S. intelligence circles. Until that time, North Korea’s
ballistic missiles were not expected to reach the 4,000 km to 6,000
km range until 2000–2004.98 It signalled to both the U.S. and Japan
that it has now the capability to strike at US military facilities at
least in Japan and on Okinawa. It is even possible that US bases
in Guam and Hawaii will eventually come within North Korea’s
missile range in a few years. Furthermore, the test was interpreted
as another North Korean attempt to inXuence the continuing nuclear
and missile talks with the U.S. in New York.99
At the same time, North Korea had probably enough extracted
plutonium for at least one or two nuclear bombs.100 In contrast to
95 Leonhard S. Spector/Mark G. McDonough/Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995),
pp. 103V.
96 Frank Umbach, “World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail—Part
One”, JIR, September 1999, pp. 33–36 and idem, “Proliferation Challenges in the
Asia-PaciWc Region and the Implications for the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance”,
in: The Japan Institute of International AVairs ( JIIA), “Security of Asia-PaciWc. Mid-
Term Report”, Tokyo, March 1999, pp. 92–107, here pp. 99V.
97 See also Newsreview (South Korea), 12 September 1998, p. 4f.
98 Greg Seidle, “North Korea’s Failed Satellite Bid VeriWed”, JDW, 23 September
1998, p. 5.
99 THK, 3 September 1998, p. 2; Joseph Bermudez, “North Koreans Test Two-
Stage IRBM over Japan”, Jane’s Defense Weekly (JDW ), 9 September 1998, p. 26 and
Shim Jae Hoon, “Fire, BackWre”, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 10 September
1998, p. 22.
100 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr./Bhupendra Jasani, “North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal”,
JIR, Special Report No. 9, p. 10.
Radtke/F5/66-133  3/9/00 1:29 PM  Page 94
the Nodong–1 programme, only very little is known about the other
ballistic missiles and their tests such as Taepo-Dong–1 and –2.101 But
North Korea is trying to sell its missiles to Pakistan, Iran and Libya
which then could be targeted to Israel or U.S. bases and allied capi-
tols in the Mediterranean region. Reportedly, North Korea is also
developing cruise missiles as tests in the Sea of Japan in the sum-
mer of 1994 have shown.
Table 2: North Korea’s Theatre Ballistic Missiles
Range Payload Number CEP Fuel Additional
(km) (kg) (m) Comments
Scud–B” 300 985 100+ 1.000 Liquid NBC-capable
‘Scud–C” 500 700 100+ 1.000–2.600 Liquid NBC-capable
Nodong–1 1.000 1.000 – 2.000–4.000 Liquid Unknown ope-
rational status; 
NBC-capable
Taepo-Dong–1 1.500– 1.000 – – Liquid Under develop-
2.000 ment; tested in
Aug. ’98
Taepo-Dong–2 3.500– – – – – Under develop-
4.000 ment
Sources: Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, “Living under the Red Missile Threat”, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, December 1996, pp. 560–564, here p. 564; Joseph S. Bermudez,
“Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRM Missiles into the Spotlight”, in: ibid., October
1998, pp. 30–32 and other sources.
Facing increasing economic diYculties since the 1980s, Iranian Wnancial
and technical support also played an important role to sustain North
Korea’s ballistic missile programmes. That has given Iran wide access
to those missile programmes in order to accelerate their own pro-
grammes as well as the possibility to purchase Pyongyang’s ballistic
missiles.102 The North Korean–Iranian connection became a major
issue for Japanese–Iranian relations because Teheran received con-
siderable economic aid from Japan. Although both North Korea and
Iran quickly denied a mutual weaponry assistance, the co-operation
between Iran and North Korea seems to continue according to var-
ious sources. Moreover, Pakistan’s missile development has revealed
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101 See also Joseph S. Bermudez, “Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRK Missiles
Back into the Spotlight”, in: JIR, October 1998, pp. 30–32.
102 Greg Gerardi/Joseph Bermudez, Jr., “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic
Missile Testing”, JIR, April 1995, pp. 184–190.
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a clandestine interregional proliferation network to evade interna-
tional controls and sanctions, which is a good example for the increas-
ing globalisation of security policies. Moreover, the Ghauri-missile
(with a range of 1,500 km) was developed on the basis of North
Korea’s No-dong-missiles and, reportedly, sold even completely to
Pakistan in 1997. The liquid-fuelled Ghauri missile is basically an en-
hanced version of the North Korean No-dong 1 (also called Rodong 1)
missile which has a similar maximum range and itself is a Scud-
derivative developed in Russia in the 1960s.103 In this light, North
Korea and China contributed directly to South Asia’s accelerating
nuclear arms race. At the same time, North Korea has also beneWted
also from technology transfers and probably from the test data of
Pakistan’s nuclear and missile tests.104 As U.S. oYcials have conWrmed
meanwhile, the USA was completely unaware of the Pakistani-North
Korean proliferation network.105
Moreover, to enhance its operational capability to ABC-warfare,
North Korea has created chemical warfare platoons at the regiment
level. With its eight factories to produce chemical weapons and other
facilities for producing biological weapons,106 North Korea is able to
conduct simultaneous chemical and biological attacks on both the
front and rear of South Korea with various delivery systems such as
artillery, multirocket launchers and Scud-missiles as well as aircraft.107
With these military capabilities and given the highly tense and
uncertain socio-economic and political situation in North Korea, the
Korean Peninsula remains the most dangerous potential Xash point
in the region. In April 1996, North Korean representatives have
reportedly threatened Japan and South Korea by warning that if
both countries will not provide North Korea with food aid and light-
water reactors, both could fall victim to four nuclear missiles.108
Whether that was a hollow threat or not (South Korea claimed it
was unlikely that North Korea has developed four missiles with a
nuclear warhead) or not, its missile programmes remain a very
eVective political weapon.
103 Tim Weiner, IHT, 5 April 1998, p. 5.
104 See also Joseph S. Bermudez, “A Silent Partner”, JDW, 20 May 1998, p. 16f.
105 Frank Umbach, “World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail—Part
One”.
106 Lee Sung-yul, TKH, 1 January 1997, p. 2.
107 TKH, 15 August 1996, p. 9 and “North Korea. A Potential Time Bomb”,
JIR, Special Report No. 2, 1994, pp. 8V.
108 Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, “Living under the Red Missile Threat”, p. 562.
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With the transition of power to Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il,
in the summer of 1994, nuclear weapons have—more than ever
before—bolstered the weak legitimacy of the new regime to ensure
both its survival of the new political regime as well as of the com-
munist system at a time of national crisis. Nonetheless, in October
1994 the United States and North Korea reached in Geneva the
1994 Agreed Framework agreement.109 The agreement envisages that
North Korea would stop all of its activities at the existing nuclear
reactors and processing plants and would not produce new nuclear
facilities. Pyongyang also agreed to place its 8.000 fuel rods in spe-
cial cans for long-term storage and to permit regular inspections as
the NPT demands. In exchange, the United States had to remove
any obstacles for political and economic contacts. Most signiWcantly,
Washington promised to supply with international Wnancing two 
modern light-water reactors (LWRs) until the year 2003 and 500.000
tons of free oil annually for Wve or six years in return for its freez-
ing and dismantling of existing reactors and storage of spent fuel
outside North Korea. The LWRs have to be build by South Korea
which was willing to Wnance the major share of the multi-billion pro-
ject.110 Other provisions of the agreement stipulate that the two sides
have to move toward full normalisation of relations and to promote
conWdence-building measures.111
For implementing the agreements and executing its commitments,
an international consortium, called the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organisation (KEDO), has been established on 9 March
1995 by South Korea, Japan and the United States.112 KEDO is
also charged with the safe storage and eventual removal of 8.000
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109 On the negotiations see Leonhard S. Spector/Mark G. McDonough/Evan S.
Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 104f., Lee Soong Hee, “The North Korean
Nuclear Issue Between Washington and Seoul: DiVerences in Perceptions and Policy
Priorities”, The Journal of East Asian AVairs, 2/1997, pp. 327–347 and the critical
analysis by Leon V. Sigal, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the
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Geneva Agreed Framework is reprinted in: Young Whan Kihl/Peter Hayes (Ed.),
Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, pp. 437–441.
110 On South Korean’s foreign policy toward its northern brethren in the con-
text of the nuclear agreement see Mel Gurtov, “South Korea’s Foreign Policy and
Future Security”.
111 “North Korea Agrees to Dismantle Nuclear programme”, Pointer-JIR, November
1994, p. 3.
112 The charter of the KEDO is reprinted in: Young Whan Kihl/Peter Hayes
(Ed.), Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, pp. 443–450.
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spent fuel rods located in a cooling pond at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility in North Korea. The major share of the estimated 5.17 bil-
lion US$ costs of the LWRs will be provided by South Korea and
Japan. Minor shares come from the United States, the EU and other
countries.113 Given the current Wnancial crisis in East Asia and South
Korea and the unwillingness of the U.S. Congress to spend funds
on this and other arms control projects, not all Wnancial problems
of the KEDO-project have been solved so far which might under-
mine the international credibility in the view of Pyongyang. In this
light the EU could also support KEDO much more than it has done
when it recognises the importance of KEDO in the light of the
regional and global proliferation challenges on the Korean Peninsula
and functioning as the Wrst operative international organisation in
Northeast Asia—a precedent that might also serve as a wider regional
security model, thereby involving North Korea in the region.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail strate-
gies, including its refusal to give international inspectors full access
to its nuclear sites,114 its ongoing missile and technology exports to
Pakistan and Iran (which has contributed to their missile programmes
as the Ghauri-missile test on 6 April 1998 and the Iranian Shahab-
3 missile test on 21 July 1998 have demonstrated), its own unexpected
missile launch of the Taepo-Dong–1 on 31 August 1998115 and rev-
elations of a vast underground facility under construction (with more
than 15,000 North Koreans workers) which U.S. intelligence sources
have identiWed to be the site of a reactor or reprocessing plant116
have now threatened the entire October 1994 Geneva Agreed Frame-
work and thereby the KEDO process. It has led to calls for a major
re-evaluation of the US policy towards North Korea.117 Even those
U.S. experts who still favour a genuine commitment to, rather than
abandoning the Agreed Framework, are arguing for a “new deal” by
incorporating “new issues of concern by supplementing it with new
113 On details see Reinhard Drifte, “The EU’s Stake in KEDO”, European Ins-
titute for Asian Studies (EIAS), BrieWng Paper No. 96/1 June 1996 and Young
Whan Kihl, “U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Accord and KEDO”, Asian Perspective 2/1997, 
S. 99–117.
114 Philip Shenon, IHT, 16 July 1998, p. 4 and David E. Sanger, IHT, 18 August
1998, pp. 1 and 4.
115 Don Kirk, IHT, 1 September 1998, pp. 1 and 4.
116 Dana Priest, IHT, 27 August 1998, p. 4 and Shawn W. Crispin/Shim Jae
Hoon, “Broken Promises”, FEER, 22 October 1998, p. 16f. 
117 See, for instance, Peter T.R. Brookes, “High Time to Re-evaluate North Korea
Policy”, PacNet Newsletter, No. 38, 2 October 1998.
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and more comprehensive commitments” into the existing agreement
because it may no longer be possible to save it.118
Furthermore, the fundamental issues of the Korean crisis—uniW-
cation, sovereignty and security—ultimately remain unresolved. The
Agreed Framework of 1994 only stopped the production of pluto-
nium at the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Centre, but not the
development, production and testing of missiles. Thereby, the cur-
rent and future denuclearization and the maintenance of peace on
the Korean Peninsula remains uncertain.119 Pyongyang still seeks to
conceal, and possibly to destroy, important information on its nuclear
weapons-grade plutonium stocks.120 Most experts believe that North
Korea has still enough plutonium for two crude nuclear devices.
Furthermore, as a consequence of preparing missile tests by North
Korea, South Korea has become interested in developing a longer-
range missile by itself. According to a 1979 bilateral agreement with
the United States, however, South Korea is tied to limit its missile
range to 180 km, independent from the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) that allows up to 298 km with warheads of 500
kg or more. Both sides have clashed repeatedly on the issue because
the U.S. side was concerned that it would weaken its leverage over
Pyongyang. But in return it has supported South Korea’s willingness
to join the MTCR.121
North Korea’s armed forces are facing tremendous diYculties as
the result of the socio-economic crisis. But its military capabilities
seems still formidable and have also been strengthened during the
last years. According to South Korean sources, Pyongyang has also
increased its stockpiles of food and oil for its armed forces and has
introduced new weapons systems in its ground, air and navy forces.122
Moreover, South Korea has currently no adequate defence capabil-
ities to counter North Korea’s missile threat. It possesses only six
Patriot missile batteries which are deployed only in the south to
defend rear-area US bases. The current economic and Wnancial cri-
sis has slowed the modernisation of its armed forces although it will
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122 Lee Sung-yul, TKH, 1 January 1997, p. 2.
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not have an impact on the military balance on the Korean Peninsula
given the economic problems of North Korea and the continued
presence of the U.S. armed forces on the South Korean soil.123
A mixture of motivations behind North Korea’s “chaos” and
“nuclear blackmail” strategies and tactics might also have played a
role for its plan to store Taiwanese nuclear waste in an abandoned
coal mine just one hour (40 miles) of the Demilitarised Zone. That
plan has raised tensions in the bilateral relationship between Seoul
and Taipei as well as serious security and environment concerns in
South Korea because it could contaminate underground water on
both sides of the border.124 Reportedly, the nuclear deal for its 60.000
barrels of radioactive waste—with a provision to increase its volume
to 200.000 barrels—should have cost Taiwan so far only 69 million
US$.125 Although North Korea has probably currently not more than
one or two nuclear warheads, a sober analysis of 1996 warned:
“While North Korea is unlikely to use nuclear weapons except under
the most extraordinary situations, there are a number of scenarios
that could conceivably lead to nuclear threats or, if mishandled by
any side, to the unintentional use of nuclear weapons.”126 Given the
fact that North Korea has neither fully disclosed its nuclear weapons
programme nor revealed its intentions and motivations it is still pos-
sible that it has built more nuclear and missile facilities underground
and dispersed them across the country. Hence its nuclear programme
might be signiWcantly broader than it is presently assumed. Given
the current political and economic situation in North Korea, it seems
rather unlikely that Pyongyang will give up all of its nuclear ambi-
tions (as one of its last trump cards) for the time being. Even more
important for the future—as the talks on rice aid and the Xood relief
have shown since 1995—remains the problem that the North Korean
leadership fears nothing else more than any opening up of its society
to the international community127 which is one of the most important
123 See also Frank Umbach, “Financial Crisis Slows But Fails to Halt East Asian
Arms Race—Part One”, in: JIR, August 1998, pp. 23–27, here p. 24f.; Part Two,
in: ibid., September 1998, pp. 34–37.
124 Charles S. Lee/Julian Baum, “Radioactive Ruckus”, FEER, 6 February 1997,
p. 16.
125 TKH, 27 January 1997, p. 1. Another source speculated the paid price to
North Korea up to 227.6 million US$—see ibid., 19 January 1997, p. 1.
126 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr./Bhupendra Jasani, “North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal”,
p. 22.
127 See also Bates Gill, “The Divided Nations of China and Korea: Discord and
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prerequisites for all “soft-landing”-strategies and more far-reaching
conWdence-building measures.
Perspectives of China’s Nuclear Forces
. . . But one thing is certain: PLA strategists have been struggling to
Wgure out how to link conventional and nuclear weapons with the
operational requirements of potential high-tech local wars over resources
and territory around China’s periphery. They are interested in how
to integrate high technology weapons with “long-distance striking 
power” so as to deter and, if necessary, deny an adversary victory in
any conceivable conventional and nuclear military conXict. PLA strate-
gists have not been content with an undiVerentiated, primitive, coun-
tervail second-strike deterrent status quo. Indeed, they appear to have
their doubts about the credibility of this kind of deterrent, doubts 
that have probably been strengthened by the prospects of U.S. TMD
[Theatre Missile Defence] development. Regrettably, in an era where
much international eVort is being put into delegitimizing the utility of
nuclear weapons, Chinese military strategists have apparently been
moving in the opposite direction,
concluded the U.S. expert Alastair Iain Johnston at the end of 1995.128
In the 1980s, Chinese military technology was heavily dependent
on Western support and co-operation which were always limited.
The Western reactions to the bloodshed on the Tiananmen Square
and their imposed sanctions confronted China with considerable prob-
lems for modernising its conventional and nuclear forces. Since that
time, China had been forced to Wnd an alternative co-operation part-
ner. That motivation is one of the major reasons why the bilateral
relations to Russia have been improved signiWcantly since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Both states have initiated a strong relationship
that focuses on Russian exports of advanced dual purposed weapon
systems and technology to China in order to compensate the loss 
of the former technological co-operation with the United States 
and other Western countries. The completed major transactions in-
clude the export of modern multirole air Wghters, diVerent kinds of 
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Dialogue”, SIPRI (Ed.), Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 133–144.
128 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’. The Concept of Limited
Deterrence”, International Security, No. 3 (Winter) 1995/96, pp. 5–42, here p. 42.
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missiles and modern submarines as well as missile destroyers. In the
future, China seems even be interested to acquire Tu–22 “BackWre”
medium-range bombers129 that could be used in nuclear operations.
Reportedly, some 100 joint Chinese-Russian research and develop-
ment projects are under way and more than 2.000 Russian techni-
cal experts are assumed to work in China in order to upgrade and
modernise China’s nuclear armed forces. Moreover, a Russian arti-
cle of August 1997 reported that both sides agreed even to work
out an automatic command and control system (C2) for China’s
strategic nuclear forces.130 But such a system is not necessarily expe-
dient for a nuclear power with less than 300 strategic nuclear war-
heads. Is this another indicator for China’s ambitions not only to
modernise its nuclear forces but also to increase its numbers of mis-
siles and warheads?
Since the beginning of its nuclear weapon programmes in the mid-
1950s and the Wrst nuclear weapon explosion on 16 October 1964,
China has always given priority for developing and modernising its
nuclear arsenal. Two years later, it launched its Wrst nuclear missile
on 25 October 1966, and detonated its Wrst hydrogen Bomb on 14
June 1967. Today, the number of nuclear weapons is still one of
the most closely guarded secrets in China’s security policy. In the
Chinese view, transparency is not in the interest of militarily “weak”
or medium-sized nuclear states (in comparison to nuclear super-
powers). According to most of the Western sources, China has cur-
rently not more than 300 deployed nuclear warheads—which is ten
times less than the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States
and Russia after the ratiWcation of START–II131—on some 70–100
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and about 120 medium-
range bombers (Tu–16 “Badger”).132 Although China, too, has built
up a nuclear triad, most of the nuclear warheads are deployed on
129 Bin Yu, “Sino-Russian Military Relations”, Asian Survey, 3 (March) 1993, pp.
303–316.
130 Nikolai Kuchin, “A Nuclear Deal of the Century?”, New Times, August 1997,
pp. 42–43.
131 Dunbar Lockwood, “The Status of U.S., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces
in Northeast Asia”, ACT, November 1994, pp. 21–24, here p. 23f.
132 SIPRI (Ed.), Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 619; Leonhard S. Spector/Mark G. McDonough/
Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 49V.; The Defence Agency of Japan
(Ed.), Defence of Japan. White Paper (Tokyo: Defence Agency/Japan Times, Ltd., July
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IRBMs and ICBMs. Most of China’s ballistic missiles have a range
of not more than 3.000 km, 20 have a range of 4.800 km and prob-
ably not more than seven ICBMs are believed to have a range of
roughly 13.000 km and thereby the capability to reach U.S. terri-
tory beyond the west coast. In addition, estimations suggest another
stored 150 ground-launched tactical warheads.133
Table 3: China’s Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs:134
< 5.500 km)
Type/ Range Payload Number CEP (m) Fuel Additional Comments
Name (km) (kg)
DF–5A 13.000+ 3.200 18–26 – Liquid liquid-silo based ICBM; 
(1981) modiWcation with an 8
MIRV-warheads 
feasible
DF–31 8.000 700 0 – Solid Road-Mobile-based
(late 1990s) ICBM with MIRV-
warheads
DF–41 12.000 800 0 – Solid Mobile-based 




(late 1990s) 8.000 700 0 – Solid Solid-fuel SLBM
Sources: Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, “Living under the Red Missile Threat”, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, December 1996, pp. 560–564, here p. 563; and “British, French,
and Chinese Nuclear Forces”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December
1996, pp. 64–67, here p. 67; Richard D. Fisher, “China Increases Its Missile Forces
While Opposing U.S. Missile Defence”, Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation,
No. 1268, 7 April 1999 and Richard D. Fisher/Baker Spring, “China’s Nuclear
and Missile Espionage Heightens the Need for Missile Defence”, ibid., No. 1303, 2
July 1999.
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1995), p. 52 and “Chinese Nuclear and Conventional Forces 1993”, ACT, December
1993, p. 29. IISS (Ed.), The Military Balance 1996/97 (London/IISS: Oxford University
Press, October 1996) numbers Chinese IRBMs on 70+ systems. However, some
estimates are much higher—see “Size of China’s Ballistic Missile Force”, Centre
for Defence and International Studies, via Internet: http://www.cdiss.org/chin-
abms.htm.
133 Robert S. Norris/Andrew S. Burrows/Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons
Databook, Volume V: British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1994), p. 358 and Table 1.7, p. 11.
134 Ranges according IISS; Chinese deWnitions: short-range (< 1.000 km); medium-
range (1.000–3.000 km); long-range (3.000–8000 km); intercontinental-range (< 8.000
km).
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Given the facts that Chinese armed forces (PLA) are confronted with
a technology lag of 20 years behind the West,135 China’s missiles are
believed to be far less accurate and thereby are still lacking the capa-
bility to deliver multiple warheads to separate targets (MIRV). The
Wrst and second-generation of research and development stages to
deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons took around 11 years. The
next stage to deploy the third generation of Chinese nuclear weapons
might take even longer, but in the end will certainly narrow the
technology gap with the West.
The question is only to which extent. But ultimately neither the
transition phase nor the Wnal stage of China’s ambitious moderni-
sation programmes for its conventional and nuclear armed forces are
reassuring for Beijing’s neighbours.
Table 4: Chinese Theatre Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs/IRBMs/SLBMs: > 5.500 km)
Type/ Range Payload Number CEP (m) Fuel Additional Comments
Name (km) (kg)
DF–11/ 280–300 800–950 – 600 Solid Road-Mobile; HE or
M–11 nuclear warhead
DF–15/ 600 500 – 300 Solid Road-mobile; separat-
M–9 ing HE or nuclear
warhead




DF–25 1.800 2.000 – – Solid Under development
DF–3A 2.800 2.150 50–150 1.000 Liquid Transportable; 1-stage;
HE or nuclear warhead
DF–4 4.750 2.200 20 – Liquid Liquid/caves/rollout
JL–1 1.700 600 12–24 – Solid 2-stage SLBM; nuclear
warhead; deployed on
one or two Xia SSBNs
Sources: Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, “Living under the Red Missile Threat”, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, December 1996, pp. 560–564, here p. 563, and “British, French,
and Chinese Nuclear Forces”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December
1996, pp. 64–67, here p. 67.
135 See also RIPS (Ed.), Asian Survey Security 1995–96 (London-Washington: Brassey’s,
1996), p. 23.
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Table 5: Chinese Nuclear Bombers
Type/Name Range Payload Number CEP (m) Additional Comments
(km) (kg)
Hong–6 (B–6) 3.100 4.500 120 1965 “Badger” type
Qian–5 (A–5) 400 1.500 (?) 30 1970 “Mig–19” redesign
Source: “British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces”, The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November/December 1996, pp. 64–67, here p. 67.
China’s nuclear strategy is currently still based de facto on a “counter
city” second-strike capability.136 But its future nuclear strategy might
rather be based on a “Xexible response” and “limited deterrence”
posture similar to Nato’s in the 1980s according to convincing Western
analysis. According to Chinese advocates of a “Xexible response” and
“limited deterrence” strategy, the Clausewitz dictum that warfare is
the continuation of politics exaggerates the uncontrollability of nuclear
war and is leading to undermine the credibility of China’s deter-
rence policy.137 Internal discussions of nuclear strategy have indicated
China’s doctrine shifts since 1985 from an early, large scale and all-
encompassing “people’s war”, based on an attrition strategy, to local
and limited wars under high-tech conditions around China’s periph-
ery. According to U.S. experts like Alastair Iain Johnston, those doc-
trine shifts have also led to an evolving concept of limited nuclear
deterrence,138 resting on a limited war-Wghting capability and deny-
ing the adversary any victory in a nuclear war.139 Such a limited
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136 D. Lockwood, “The Status of U.S., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces in
Northeast Asia”, p. 23.
137 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’, p. 13f., and id., “Prospects
for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral
Arms Control”, The China Journal, June 1996, pp. 548–576.
138 Chinese strategists explicitly distinguish “limited nuclear deterrence” from “minimum
deterrence”: In the Wrst term, nuclear weapons play a much greater (counterforce-)
warWghting role in the deterrence of both conventional and nuclear wars, particu-
larly in the context of escalation control and intra-war deterrence—see Alastair Iain
Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking”, pp. 12 and 19f.
139 On the Chinese military doctrine shifts since 1985 see Paul H.B. Godwin,
“From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards
2000”, The China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 464–487; Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving
WarWghting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–95: A Chinese Perspective”, ibid.,
pp. 443–463, Yao Yunzhu, “The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese
PLA from 1985 to 1995”, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 2/1995, pp. 57–80
and David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine
and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000”, The Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 1
(Spring) 1994, pp. 3–25.
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deterrence doctrine requires the development of a greater number
of tactical, theatre, and strategic nuclear weapons with improved
accuracy to target nuclear forces in addition to cities. In the view
of Chinese experts, however, China’s modernisation programme of
its nuclear weaponry has rather “limited aims” whilst Western experts
exaggerate the importance and the inXuence of the “limited deter-
rence” school in the PLA for the decision-making processes of the
nuclear modernisation programmes.140
China’s ambitious modernisation programmes of its nuclear forces,
including that of its IRBMs “to provide strategic dominance over
East Asia” (Richard Fisher),141 are another proof of the shifts because
they seem mainly proactively doctrine-driven (a departure from the
PLA’s past rather reactive practice). They demand changes in the
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) force structure, strategy and con-
cepts of operation. Given Western estimations of China’s current
Wssile material stock, it can expand its nuclear forces after acquiring
the MIRV142 technology two or three times of its present size (from
300 to 600–900 warheads).143 Despite facing tremendous problems
in modernising its armed forces which is hampered by insuYcient
funds—although even the oYcial military budget has increased by
approximately 33–40 per cent in real terms over the past Wve years144—
and the low level of its military technology base, numerous devel-
opment programmes of its nuclear forces are under way. In contrast
to the United States and Russia, the modernisation and expansion
of China’s nuclear and conventional armed forces had not been con-
strained by any international arms control regime until 1996. At the
same time, uncertainty about these Chinese modernisation programmes
and Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions behind those military pro-
grammes under way arise primarily from the lack of transparency
in its military sphere.
140 Hongxun Hua, “China’s Strategic Missile Programmes: Limited Aims, not
‘Limited Deterrence’”, The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1998, pp. 60–68.
141 Quoted following the article “China Upgrades Medium-Range Missiles Targeting
East Asia”, ADJ 8/1997, p. 63.
142 MIRV = Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle.
143 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking”, p. 36. To China’s MIRV
development programmes see James Lamson/Wyn Bowen, “One Arrow, Three
Stars: China’s MIRV programme—Part I”, JIR, May 1997, pp. 216–218 and Part
II, ibid., June 1997, pp. 266–269.
144 See also “China’s Military Expenditure”, IISS (Ed.), Military Balance 1995–1996
(London/IISS: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 270–275 and Shaoguang Wang,
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The focus on improving the qualitative level of China’s nuclear
forces with the help of recruited former Soviet weapon scientists and
engineers is directed toward a miniaturising of warheads, better tar-
geting accuracy, penetration and anti-electronic interference capa-
bility, modernising its C2–networks, developing a MIRV capability as
well as increasing the survivability and the camouXage of its nuclear
forces such as storing them underground and deploying them on
mobile, land-based launchers or submarines.145 The PLA navy is cur-
rently working on a new advanced nuclear submarine which will
carry 12 SLBMs and will be deployed in the next decade. As part
of the programme, this new type of a nuclear submarine will be
equipped with a new SLBM, called Jiulong–2 (CCS-NX–4 ), with a
range of 8.000 km. It will allow Chinese submarines for the Wrst
time to target parts of the U.S. from areas located near the Chinese
coast.146 Western experts anticipate that China will deploy 4–6 sub-
marines, each armed with 12 SLBMS. That would add alone 48–72
warheads to China’s nuclear arsenal, with even more, if China can
succeed with its MIRV development (expanding the number of war-
heads on the SLBMs at least two or three times).147 A new mobile,
solid-fuel ICBM, named Dongfeng–31 (DF–31), had been tested by
China at the end of May 1995, a few days after the indeWnite exten-
sion of the NPT and in August 1999. It also has a range of 8.000
km and can carry a payload of 200–300 Kt. The new ICBM is
expected to be operable prior to the year 2000.148 Another solid-fuel
mobile ICBM (DF–41) under development will have a range of
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“Estimating China’s Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources”,
The China Quarterly, September 1996, pp. 889–911.
145 See also Yang Huan, “China Strategic Nuclear Weapons”, in: Michael Pillsbury
(Ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington D.C.: National Defence University
Press, 1997), pp. 131–135, here p. 134f.; Dunbar Lockwood, “The Status of U.S.,
Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia”, pp. 332V.; Holly Porteous,
“China’s View of Strategic Weapons”, JIR, March 1996, pp. 134–136; in context
see also Vipin Gupta, “Assessment of the Chinese Nuclear Test Site Near Lop
Nor”, ibid., August 1993, pp. 378–381 and Yan Kong, “China’s Nuclear Bureaucracy”,
ibid., July 1993, pp. 320–326.
146 See also Nigel Holloway, “Touchy Issue. China Gets Defensive on Missile
Reductions”, FEER, 23 October 1997, p. 29f.
147 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation”,
p. 562f.
148 RIPS (Ed.), Asian Survey Security 1995–96 (London-Washington: Brassey’s, 1996),
p. 29f. and Paul H.B. Godwin, “Uncertainty, Insecurity and China’s Military Power”,
Current History, September 1997, pp. 252–257, here p. 257.
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12.000 km and is anticipated to become operational before 2005–
2010.149 Furthermore, China is also developing ground—and air-
launched, land-attack cruise missiles, partly from versions of its 
turbojet powered C–802 anti-ship missile. Reportedly, this cruise mis-
sile with a range of at least 120 km, carrying a payload of 165 kg,
will incorporate a highly accurate Global Positioning System (GPS)
guidance system and a terrain contour-matching radar to improve
the accuracy required to perform precision-strikes against high-value
civilian and military targets such as command and control centres
or government buildings in Taipei.150 This and other future cruise
missiles with their low altitudes will present a major detection chal-
lenge for future Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) radar and eVective
counter measures. A report to the U.S. Congress warned in 1997:
“A missile Xeet of this size could overwhelm any theatre missile
defence capability planned for this vital region and fundamentally
alter regional calculations of the balance of power.”151
However, China presently still lacks an adequate limited nuclear
war Wghting posture with a satellite based early-warning (EW) capa-
bility and suYcient counterforce as well as countervalue tactical, the-
atre and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional
or nuclear war. But it is also clear that China is going to close this
“window of opportunity”—the gap between its operational require-
ments of the limited deterrence strategy and its nuclear doctrine
assumptions—for its perceived potential adversaries. It is the result
of the logical conclusion of China’s strategists that Beijing’s deter-
rent is uncertain or even frail and with that not credible enough. It
leads already to a greater Chinese interest in launch-on-warning or
launch-under-early attack postures and hence pre-emptive nuclear
strategies152 that ultimately will undermine crisis stability. Then the
civilian and military leadership might face similar problems of com-
mand and control of nuclear weapons in crisis and war times like
Russia nowadays.
149 John Wilson Lewis/Hua Di, “China’s Balllistic Missile programmes. Tech-
nologies, Strategies, Goals”, International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5–40, p. 11.
150 Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, “Living under the Red Missile Threat”, p. 561
and John Downing, “China Develops Cruise Missiles”, Asia-PaciWc Defence Reporter
(A-PDR), August-September 1997, p. 6.
151 Quoted following the article by Barbara Starr, “China Could ‘Overwhelm’
Regional Missile Shield”, Jane’s Defence Weekly ( JDW), 23 April 1997, p. 16.
152 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’”, p. 21f.
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In the view of China, an eVective TMD-option of the United
States and its allies Japan, South Korea and Taiwan against China’s
nuclear ballistic missiles would not only question its nuclear deter-
rence against those potential aggressors but also dramatically increase
the U.S. ability to launch a disarming Wrst strike against China.
Consequently, China is—like Russia—essentially interested in the
endorsement of the principles behind the ABM-treaty.153 Although
Beijing’s objections against TMD-systems in its three neighbouring
countries are to some extent understandable, most of China’s argu-
ments are not very convincing and persuasive if they are analysed
more in detail.154 Moreover, it had recently deployed between 150
to 200 of M-class—up from 30–50 missiles three years ago—ballis-
tic missiles in southern China towards the Taiwan Strait and might
plan to raise the number to around 650 in the next years, as a
Pentagon report for submission to the US Congress and Taiwanese
sources have indicated.155
With those nuclear weapon programmes under development and
the ultimate goal of the Chinese political-military elite to narrow the
technological gap to the United States and Russia and to create a
less vulnerable, more Xexible, and more reliable strategic retaliatory
force, Beijing pushed through four nuclear tests (such as on 15 May
and 17 August 1995 as well as its last 44th and 45th tests on 8 June
and on 29 July 1996) from 1995 to 1996. China ignored thereby
any international or regional repercussions before Wnally it pledged
a moratorium as a pre-condition of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT).156
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153 See also Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modern-
isation: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control”, p. 573f.
154 Frank Umbach, “World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail—Part
Two”, JIR, October 1999, pp. 35–39, here p. 37f.
155 Tony Walker/Stephen Fidler, FT, 10 February 1999, pp. 1 and 4; James
Kynge, ibid., 11 February 1999, p. 12 and ADJ 3/1999, p. 56.
156 Tony Walker/Frances Williams, FT, 30 July 1996, p. 1 and TKH, 30 July
1996, p. 1.
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Table 6: China’s Nuclear Arsenal vis-à-vis the Other Four Original Nuclear
Weapon States
Strategic Nuclear Weapons of the Original “Nuclear Five” (1999)
Country Suspected strategic Suspected non-strategic Suspected total nuclear  
nuclear weapons nuclear weapons weapons
China 284 150 434
France 482 0 482
Russia 7,200 6,000–13,000 13,200–20,000
UK 100 100 200
USA 8,500 7,000 15,500
Source: Ehsan Ahrari, “China Eyes NATO’s Nuclear Doctrine”, in: Jane’s Intelligence
Review ( JIR), April 1999, p. 38f., here p. 39.
While the assumption that China will be able to close the gap between
the nuclear doctrine and its operational requirements as well as capa-
bilities over the next decade remains uncertain, China’s nuclear
strength will nonetheless increase as the consequence of the inter-
national denuclearization between the nuclear superpowers United
States and Russia. By implementing START–II, both arsenals will
be downsized to 3.–3.500 warheads. Consequently, the combined
nuclear arsenal of both superpowers to Chinese strategic nuclear
forces would fall from 70:1 to 7:1, or 3.5:1 compared with one of the
nuclear superpowers (see the table above).157 Forthcoming START–III
negotiations between the U.S. and Russian side will further reduce
their arsenals to expected 2.000–2.500 nuclear warheads on each
side or even more (in the case of Russia) until the end of 2007. A
Chinese nuclear arsenal of some 600–900 warheads in the future
would then automatically not only raise China’s global political pres-
tige but also the scope of its regional nuclear and conventional mil-
itary options in the Asia-PaciWc region (including towards the United
States). Moreover, one has to take into account that China has in
contrast to the United States no security commitments requiring a
credible extended deterrence posture that justiWes high numbers of
warheads. However, it might help to explain another trend of China’s
discussions of military doctrine—the increasing linkage between the
157 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation:
Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control”, p. 563.
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PLA’s conventional and nuclear options.158 With a secure northern
border towards Russia, China’s military strategy has now shifted its
attention from the more general peripheral defence of the country
to concrete maritime defence in order to guarantee militarily its
oYcially claimed economic zones and territorial sovereignty in the
South China Sea and increased military options toward Taiwan.159
Against this background, China’s increasing nuclear retaliatory capa-
bility might have primarily the function to prevent great power inter-
ference in local and limited conventional wars under high-tech
conditions with small and medium powers such as those in the South
China Sea. A credible nuclear deterrence option that guarantees
nuclear escalation and its control similar to Nato’s Xexible response
strategy of the 1980s requires thus both the qualitative modernisa-
tion and quantitative increase of China’s nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the
United States and Russia.
Although the most dramatic improvements of China’s armed forces
are indeed taking place in its strategic and theatre nuclear force
modernisation, its future capabilities might be constrained by China’s
adherence to the CTBT, a Wssile material cut-oV, the possibility to
deploy Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) or Theatre Missile Defence
(TMD) systems in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and possible 
START–IV negotiations between all Wve nuclear powers.160 Critical
technological limitations such as computer capabilities for satellite-
linked C3I or increasing the number, accuracy and survivability of
delivery means might also constrain an unlimited modernisation pro-
gramme of its nuclear forces. However, as analysis of China’s last
military exercises and missile tests161 as well as revelations of export-
ing 46 powerful U.S. supercomputers to the Chinese Academy of
Sciences162 (which could be used for the testing of nuclear warheads)
have shown, those technical constraints might not be the major 
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158 See also Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving WarWghting Doctrine, Strategy, and
Tactics, 1985–95”, p. 460.
159 Paul H.B. Godwin, “From Continent to Periphery”, p. 474.
160 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation:
Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control”, pp. 564V.
161 Greg Gerardi/Richard Fisher Jr., “China’s Missile Tests Show More Muscle”,
JIR, March 1997, pp. 125–129 and M.V. Rappai, “Chinese Military Exercises. A
Study”, Strategic Analysis, November 1996, pp. 1119–1131.
162 G. Milhollin, IHT, 1–2 March 1997, p. 8., ibid., 13 June 1997, p. 5 and 
J. Gerth/M.R. Gordon, ibid., 28 October 1997, pp. 1 and 10.
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barrier against the modernisation programmes for China’s nuclear
armed forces. Relaxed U.S. export control for sensitive dual-use tech-
nologies could indeed help China to build stealthier and longer range
cruise and ballistic missiles with a much greater accuracy163 as the
recent Cox-report has also conWrmed.164
At the same time, these Chinese nuclear weapon programmes,
however, are not the only proliferation concerns of China’s neigh-
bours in North- and Southeast Asia as well as of the United States.
China’s weaponry and military technology export policy, too, dic-
tated by the need to earn hard currency and to raise its political-
military inXuence in the region, have caused uncertainty and instability
in the region and particularly in its bilateral relation with the U.S.165
It also included the export of technology and delivery means such
as dual-use nuclear technology, missile technology as well as dual-
use chemicals and chemical-production technologies to nuclear thresh-
old countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and other potential nuclear
proliferation states.
It underscores the main question whether China is willing and
able to function as an important player of the international com-
munity in order to stabilise and not to undermine regional and global
security. China is hitherto not a member of the MTCR in which
28 countries agreed not to export missiles capable of carrying a
500–kg warhead more than 300 km. Although the U.S. and China
reached a quid-pro-quo compromise in October 1993, it called simul-
taneously for continued MTCR discussions and interpretations.166
Another fact is even more important. While Beijing has also
promised and underscored its willingness to implement a nation-wide
eVective export control system to prevent sales of sensitive prolifer-
ation-related technologies and end-products, no speciWc plan for action
163 See also Nigel Holloway, “Cruise Control”, FEER, 14 August 1997, pp. 14–16.
164 Stephen Fidler, FT, 26 May 1999, p. 4.
165 See also Banning N. Garrett/Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear
Arms Control”, International Security, No. 3 (Winter) 1995/96, pp. 43–78 and Mitchel
B. Wallerstein, “China and Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?”, Survival, No. 3
(Autumn) 1996, pp. 58–66.
166 China pointed out that the M–11 was speciWcally designed with an 800 kg
payload and a range of 20 km short of the MTCR restriction of 300 km. U.S.
experts in contrast noted that a lower payload will enhance the range of the Chinese
declared one and thus fall under the MCTR. The compromise stipulated that China
will not export missiles with a range of 300 km and with a payload of at least 500
kg—see Paul H.B. Godwin/John J. Schulz, “China and Arms Control: Transition
in East Asia”, ACT, November 1994, pp. 7–11, here p. 11.
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had been implemented until early 1997 in contrast to Taiwan. Then,
however, China has taken new assurances, commitments and con-
crete steps which meet international standards: In May 1997, China’s
State Council issued a new directive to all government agencies and
non-governmental entities on the control of nuclear-related exports
to prevent covered exchanges of technical personnel and informa-
tion; one month later, it published an interim list of nuclear-related
dual-use technologies identical to the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s dual-
use list; in September 1997, the State Council established new nuclear
export control regulations identical to the list used by the Nuclear
Supplier Group; Wnally, in October 1997, China became a member
of the NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee). This was
the Wrst time that China has joined a multilateral non-proliferation
export control regime. These various steps constitute a positive shift
in China’s nuclear non-proliferation policies and practices.167 However,
they might conXict with other foreign and national security interests
of China. During Jiang Zemin’s South-East-Asian visits to India,
Pakistan and Nepal at the end of 1996, he conWrmed, for instance,
to maintain its co-operation with Pakistan concerning the “civilian
use of nuclear energy”.168 It seems also to continue transferring mis-
sile components and technology to countries like Pakistan and Iran.169
It might also highlight a fundamental shift from China’s traditional
weapons and military related export policy to technology transfers,
scientiWc assistance, production technologies, subcomponents, and
dual use transfers which are much more diYcult to monitor than
exports of complete weapon systems or plants. This shift, however,
is not a special Chinese version of a weaponry export policy but
rather a global non-proliferation trend and challenge. Whether the
new U.S.-China agreement of December 1997 that shall exclude any
weapons and technology transfers for Iran’s missile and nuclear
weapon programmes will really change Beijing’s long-term weaponry
and dual-use export policies remains to be seen and will be dependent
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Active Leading”, The PaciWc Review 4/1996, pp. 577–606; Hung-yi Jan, “The PRC’s
Policies Toward Nonproliferation Regimes”, Issues and Studies, 11/1997, pp. 112–132.
168 Neue Zuericher Zeitung (NZZ), 29 November 1996, p. 5 and ibid., 5 December
1996, p. 5.
169 Douglas, Waller, “The Secret Missile Deal”, Time, 30 June 1997 and Thomas
W. Lippman, The Washington Post, 23 May 1997, pp. A1 and A33.
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on both internal and external developments during the transitional
stage.170 Thus far, China is neither a “team player” nor a “rogue
elephant”.171
In order to promote transparency, security and stability in East
Asia, the Chinese willingness to co-operate is an essential prerequi-
site for new arms control negotiations and the success of treaties and
regimes such as a global Wssile material production cut-oV conven-
tion.172 Similar as in the case of the CTBT, an Indian signature is
dependent on China and a Pakistani ratiWcation on India’s. Thus
far, Chinese strategists seem not very concerned about future regional
proliferation around its borders.173 Therefore, China stands at the
cross-roads in its non-proliferation policy that might become a lit-
mus test of its future role in regional and global aVairs with direct
implications of foreign policies towards Beijing. A continued Chinese
nuclear and missile technology co-operation with Pakistan, for instance,
might further backWre and Wnally be counterproductive for Beijing’s
own security some day in the not-too-distant future as the Wve Indian
nuclear tests in May 1999 and New Delhi’s justiWcation as a coun-
terbalance to China’s nuclear arsenal (and not Pakistan’s) have already
demonstrated.
A New Proliferation Threat: The Example of the AUM
SHINRIKYO Doomsday Cult—A Watershed in Terrorism?
In a world poised between the Cold War and the new millennium,
the tale of Aum is a mirror of our worst fears. Heavily armed mili-
tias, terrorist cells, zealous cults and crime syndicates all Wnd their
voice in the remarkable ascent of this bizarre sect. For years, expert
have warned us: the growing sophistication of these groups, combined
170 On the agreement see The Strait Times, 12 September 1997, p. 28 and Joseph
Fitchett, IHT, 11 December 1997, pp. 1 and 4.
171 On the metaphor James V. Feinerman, “Chinese Participation in the Interna-
tional legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?”, The China Quarterly, March
1995, pp. 186–210.
172 Lisbeth Gronlund/David Wright/Yong Liu, “China and a Fissile Material
Production Cut-oV ”, Survival, 4 (Winter) 1995–96, pp. 147–67. To a Chinese view
see Xia Liping, “Maintaining Stability in the Presence of Nuclear Proliferation in
the Asia-PaciWc Region”, Comparative Strategy, 1995, pp. 277–286.
173 Taeho Kim, “China and Virtual Nuclear Arsenals”, in: Michael J. Mazarr
(Ed.), “Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World”, pp. 207–217, here p. 214.
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with the spread of modern technology, will bring about anew era in
terrorism and mass murder. The coming of Aum Supreme Truth shows
how close these nightmares have come to reality.
(So the authors David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall in their
remarkable investigation of Aum Shinrikyo)174
The Sarin nerve gas attack in the heart of Tokyo on 20 March
1995, killing 12 people and injuring about 5.500 others, was the Wrst
use of non-conventional weapons by a pseudo-religious sect using
terrorist means. At the same time, destructive intentions of fanatical
individuals and groups have also manifested themselves in the United
States as the terrorist attacks in Oklahoma (killing 168 people) and
the World Trade Centre in New York City have shown. But for
Japan which has one of the lowest crime rates in the world175 and
that has never experienced terrorist challenges like the United States
or European countries (such as Italy, France or Germany) it was a
deep and lasting shock. The image of a safe nation on a safe island
had been shattered. It revealed that Japan is no longer an island
secure against such security challenges. In that respect, the Sarin
nerve gas attack was a watershed in terrorism for both Japan and
the rest of the world.176
The widespread feeling of insecurity within the Japanese society
and government continued in the following months, even after the
raids of the Aum facilities and the arrest of Asahara. Rumours of
new Aum attacks after the arrest of Asahara and key members of
his followers seemed to be conWrmed on 19 April 1995 when more
than 500 people were sickened by mysterious fumes in underground
train passages and train cars as well as two days later in a shopping
complex near the JR Yokohama Station. Although nobody suVered
serious ill eVects and had to be treated in hospitals like after the
Sarin attack, the nervousness of the Japanese society had been 
deepened because the police was again unable to prove whether the
new incidents had been initiated by Aum followers or were merely
copycat crimes. On 23 April 1995, Hideo Murai, the Science and
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175 Japan has also the world’s highest rate of criminal conviction. But it stems at
least in part from its practice of making no arrests until they have all the evidence
needed for a conviction.
176 “Terror in the Heart of Japan. The Aum Shinrikyo Doomsday Cult”. The
Japan Times Special Report, July 1995.
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Technology Minister of Aum, was murdered by a follower in front
of hundreds of police and press cameramen at the entrance of Aum’s
headquarter. On 5 May 1995—in the middle of the Golden Week
holidays—a new gas attack was intended to kill innocent people. But
the lethal chemicals could be discovered in time, preventing thus the
possible death of estimated 10.000–20.000 people. On 16 May 1995,
when Asahara was Wnally arrested, a letter bomb mailed to the
Governor of Metropolitan Tokyo exploded in the hands of his sec-
retary who lost the Wngers of his left hand. Against that background
and coming back from a trip to China, Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama’s helpless question “what is going on?” to his aides, under-
scored the widespread feeling of insecurity within the Japanese gov-
ernment and society.177
In the past, most of the terrorists were politically motivated and
therefore their aims were rather limited with speciWc targets. They
were often sponsored by governments of “rogue states” which also
imposed certain constraints their action. But the Aum terrorism seems
to follow no presumed rationality and had not imposed any con-
straints on their actions. In this light, Japan was not only facing a
so far unknown “normal terrorism” but at the same time a new
form of it, involving religion which turned to be more devastating
than ever seen before in the world. The Aum leader and his fol-
lowers had seen themselves surrounded by non-believers which are
for them simply enemies. Any rational behaviour and communica-
tion between the attackers and the attacked state and society were
therefore from the very beginning limited and hence the inXuence
on preventing further attacks of Aum followers rather small.
Even more important was the fact that the Aum cult had suc-
cessfully inWltrated various departments of the Japanese government
and industry including elements of law enforcement, the military and
the defence industry. Moreover, the cult acquired conventional arma-
ments and attempted to acquire non-conventional weapons and tech-
nologies from the United States and the FSU. It planned attacks not
only on the Japanese but also on the U.S. government. Neither their
intentions nor the technology acquirements were fully discovered by
the Japanese and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence services until
the Tokyo gas attack on 20 March 1995.
177 The Japan Times, 7 May 1995, pp. 1–2, here p. 1.
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The Japanese investigators found evidence that not only Sarin had
been produced, but also Tabun, Soman and VX.178 Furthermore,
they also embarked upon intense research and development pro-
grammes for the production of biological weapons, using agents such
as Botulism and Anthrax, Q-fever and even ebola. Reportedly, they
had actually attempted to use bacterial warfare.179 Thereby, the cult
followers developed and produced those chemical and biological ele-
ments “on a scale not previously identiWed with a sub-national ter-
rorist group”.180 It was possible for them to create such sophisticated
research and production facilities without attracting the attention of
either Japanese or foreign governments and intelligence circles. They
planned to produce 70 tons of Sarin within 40 days after the pro-
duction facility had been completed. Aum also purchased a Russian
Mi–17 helicopter for 78 million Yen and smuggled it secretly into
Japan. In addition, they wanted also to buy Russian tanks (includ-
ing T–72s) for prices, ranging from 200.000–1 million US$. Investigated
documents showed proposed arrangements for secret deliveries.181
They also organised military training tours in Russian military facil-
ities after the permission of top-ranking military oYcers which involved
training from members of Spetsnaz elite units.182 Furthermore, they
bought KGB commando manuals for training of Aum’s followers.
Originally, it was even planned to spray Sarin via helicopter over
Tokyo. Aum members had also constructed a vehicle used to spray
Sarin in Matsumoto.183 As the investigation has shown meanwhile
the cult carried out at least nine biological attacks until 1995.
Most of the information concerning the production of lethal chem-
ical substances, which Aum’s Science and Development Agency was
looking for, was received from brief searches in Internet. It provides
innumerable ways to obtain such sensitive information as U.S. experts
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179 StaV Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings
on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,
Washington, October 31, 1995, pp. 25V.
180 Ibid., p. 21.
181 Eric Croddy, “Urban Terrorism—Chemical Warfare in Japan”, JIR, November
1995, pp. 520–523, here p. 522.
182 OYcially it had been denied by the Russian side that training of pilots took
place. But Russian oYcials admitted that there are many private companies with
helicopters at their disposal—see “StaV Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations. Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo”, p. 39.
183 Mainichi Daily News, 21 October 1995, p. 1.
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have found out after the Sarin attack.184 Aum earmarked the U.S.
as a major shopping centre not only for its programmes of devel-
oping mass destruction weapons but also for its vast business empire
to Wnance the launch of Armageddon in November 1995 by gassing
the Diet building ( Japan’s parliament). Aum was obviously engaged
in a concerted eVort to obtain scientiWc data and sophisticated research
equipment “used in some of the most advanced biological laborato-
ries”.185 The computerised chemical plant of Aum was, too, extremely
sophisticated according to Japanese investigations.
Very intriguing was also Aum’s presence in Australia in an area
which is known for its uranium deposit. The cult purchased a 500.000
acre sheep farm. They conducted mostly unknown experiments, but
obviously for planning to mine uranium for the development of
nuclear weapons186 and for experiments with Sarin on sheep at its
Australian property.187 Thus a Wnal report of the U.S. Senate sub-
committee on investigations of the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack con-
cluded in October 1995:
The ease with which the cult accessed the vast international super-
market of weapons and weapons technology is extremely troubling. It
is especially troubling in light of the current state of the economies
and governments of the former Soviet Union. How much this cult
acquired and how much more they could have obtained is still a mys-
tery. How much the next group may be able to acquire is the ques-
tion that also remains unanswered.188
The Aum Shinrikyo cult was developing not only chemical weapons
such as Sarin, but also biological ones, studying laser arms, trying
to mine uranium and making uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons
184 StaV Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings
on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,
p. 22f.
185 Ibid.
186 See also The Japan Times, 2 July 1995, p. 2. The author also thanks A. John
McFarlane from the Australian Defence Force Academy for providing information
on Aum’s activities in Australia. On results of an Australian investigation see JeV
Penrose, “Western Australian Link to Japanese Doomsday Cult”, Platypus Magazine
(the Journal of the Australian Federal Police), December 1995, pp. 5–10.
187 StaV Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings
on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,
pp. 41V.
188 StaV Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings
on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,
p. 55.
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in Australia, assembling guns and riXes, making drugs and narcotics
like LSD, and using truth serum on its own followers. Thereby, they
operated world-wide: in Japan, the United States, Russia, Australia,
Germany and other countries.
The initial gas attack on Tokyo created a widespread chaos and
apprehension but it caused relatively few fatalities among the pop-
ulation. The accidental release of anthrax in Sverdlovsk (Russia) in
1979, for instance, is estimated to have killed between 400 and 1.200
people.189 In the Tokyo gas attack case, analysts have attributed the
rather small number of innocent victims to a variety of factors such
as: the deliberate dilution of Sarin; to provide protection for the
attackers and facilitate subsequent spread; the small quantity of Sarin
used; the rapid response of emergency personnel, although it had
heavily been criticised as insuYcient in the Japanese press, and the
unusually powerful air exchange systems of most of Tokyo’s subway
stations.190
In this light, the question arises whether and to which extent the
international community has drawn lessons from the terrible expe-
rience in order to prevent similar tragedies in the future and to
strengthen countermeasures against those new forms of terrorist threats
and its non-proliferation policies.191 Meanwhile, Japan and other
countries have started to examine the lessons and consequences after
the Tokyo gas attack. The Japanese police admitted, for instance,
errors, miscalculation, misjudgement and indecision during its inves-
tigation of the Sarin gas attack. New reports have also revealed how
unprepared and unequipped the police and other special services
were after the gas attack.192
Given the fact that not only Japan but also the United States,
Russia and Europe were and are still largely unprepared to counter
those new forms of international terrorism, it is of utmost impor-
tance to combine national countermeasures and to promote any form
of information exchange. Ultimately, the Sarin nerve gas attack com-
pels international co-operation on common anti-terrorist measures
and non-proliferation eVorts.
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Although one can assume that most terrorist groups will also in
the future not cause mass killings, using rather non-conventional
weaponry and prefer the use of chemical and biological weapons,
nuclear terrorism should not be totally dismissed any longer.193 Only
few groups will certainly have the means and skills to acquire nuclear
material. But unfortunately, as the German strategic analyst Uwe
Nerlich has pointed out, “most potent terrorist groups are likely to be
both most capable of a determined pursuit of objectives and most capa-
ble of acquiring and handling weapons-grade nuclear material.”194
It is also important to stress the fact that the quality of Wssile
material is only important for bomb making. But most other forms
of nuclear terrorism would be just as eVective using industrial-grade
Wssile material as weapon-grade material or a nuclear-enriched con-
ventional explosion (by a crude, non-Wssionable atomic bomb, also
called “dirty bomb”). The Chechen case in Moscow in November
1995, when terrorists had hidden four cases of radioactive caesium
(310 times the normal amount of radioactivity) in the well-known
Ismailovo Park195 conWrmed the use of a conventional device with a
highly radioactive coating rather than a operational nuclear bomb.
It created chaos and helplessness in Moscow’s security circles. In this
light, “thinking about the unthinkable” might be the only reliable,
but certainly also most unpopular policy guideline of changing the
current unpreparedness of highly vulnerable Western industrial soci-
eties. Thus far, in the West only the U.S. Energy Department main-
tains a nuclear emergency search team trained to disable terrorist
nuclear devices—a programme, however, which is underWnanced and
understaVed according to U.S. experts.196 Although Aum Shinrikyo
is still under investigation and banned in Japan and Russia, it has
survived. It is still active and recruiting successfully new members.197
While organised crime organisations and other non-state actors are
193 Also Japan is still threatened by terrorist challenges because the Japanese Red
Army ( JRA) is still able to conduct further terrorist acts despite recent successes of
arresting JRA members—see Bruce HoVmann, “Creatures of the Cold War: the
JRA”, JIR, February 1997, pp. 80–82.
194 Uwe Nerlich, “The Political and Strategic Analysis of Nuclear Non-State Actors
and Sponsoring States: What to Look for?”, SWP-AP 2908, Ebenhausen, June 1995,
p. 16.
195 Gavin Cameron, “Nuclear Terrorism”, JIR, September 1996, pp. 422–425,
here p. 425.
196 Jessica Stern, IHT, 20–21 July 1996, p. 6.
197 Kevin Sullivan, IHT, 30 September 1997, p. 2.
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forming powerful multinational alliances (such as the Russian and
Colombian criminal organisations), the greater availability of exper-
tise and resources could overcome former technological barriers as
the example of Aum Shinrikyo has demonstrated. The threat of
bioterrorism in particular is rising198 which demands more national
and international attention and countermeasures.
A Nuclear Weaponisation?—Japan’s Current Non-Nuclear
Weapon Status and Its Future
In the context of analysing Japan’s non-proliferation policies and its
civilian nuclear energy programmes, a signiWcant gap exists between
Japan’s own image as a paciWstic society and a country pursuing
only peaceful policies, and the lasting distrust of other Asian nations
in Japanese politics. In no other Weld the gap of views between Japan
and other Asian nations is so profound as in the nuclear one. While
since 1968 Japan has repeatedly declared to adhere to the three non-
nuclear principles—namely not manufacturing, possessing, or allow-
ing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil199—, experts outside Japan are
often sceptical or even suspicious of Japan’s civilian nuclear and
rocket programmes. Despite Japan’s ratiWcation of the NPT in 1976,
sceptical experts of other Asian countries and in the United States
have pointed out that Japan is the only non-nuclear weapon state
operating uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants simultane-
ously. All of them are technically capable of producing Wssile mate-
rial for nuclear weapons. In their views, it is particularly the magnitude
of the civilian Japanese nuclear projects and speciWc programmes
such as Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) or Mixed Fuel Rods (MOX)
that raise widespread proliferation concerns.200 With its 51 nuclear
reactors (28 of them located along the Japan Sea coastline), Japan
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is generating currently almost 30 per cent of its electricity from the
civilian use of nuclear power and is, therewith, the third largest
nuclear energy producer in the world (after the United States and
France). Moreover, whilst Japan’s plutonium stockpile amounted to
13.1 tons at the end of 1994, it might rise to 89 tons of Wssile plu-
tonium (about 125 tons of total plutonium) over the next two decades
(the combined superpower arsenal accounts currently to 220 tons)
that have to be separated in Japan or abroad under commercial
contracts.201
Giving up Japan’s plutonium programme, however, is not a suYcient
guarantee of Japan’s non-nuclear weapon status because it will always
have the technological know how and experience to build them if
necessary. Hence Japan will also retain the capability to acquire
nuclear weapons through the continued existence of its civilian nuclear
programmes such as other non-nuclear weapon states.202 Furthermore,
Japan’s plutonium programme has also created double standards 
in the U.S. non-proliferation policy because Tokyo had de facto the
approval of Washington for its programme, while the United States
simultaneously insisted that North Korea must abandon its pluto-
nium reprocessing facilities.
On the other hand, the mistrust in Japan’s foreign and prolifer-
ation policies has even increased since the end of the Cold War
when U.S. administrations moved their attention from arms control
agreements with Moscow to regional and global non-proliferation
eVorts. The economic dynamics in East Asia, the rapid modern
weapon technology acquisition and diVusion as well as an emerging
Chinese hegemon on the horizon have not only contributed to the
widespread feeling of insecurity in the region but also to the mis-
trust in Japan’s future non-nuclear weapon status. In the light of
Japan’s changing security environment with China and North Korea
as nuclear powers in its proximity, Tokyo might be forced to rethink
its current status as a non-nuclear weapon state in the near future.203
201 Motoya Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium programme: A Proliferation Threat?”,
The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1996, pp. 1–16, here p. 8 and Kumao Kaneko,
“Japan Needs No Umbrella”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 1996,
pp. 46–51, here p. 47.
202 Motoya Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium programme”, p. 10.
203 See, for instance, in context of the regional security in Northeast Asia Gerald
Segal, “The Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia”, p. 313f. and Ralph A. Cossa,
“Nuclear Forces in the Far East”, p. 369f.
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Moreover, Japan’s declared three non-nuclear principles do not have
a legal basis in the constitution. Only the Atomic Energy Basic Law
of 1955 prohibits Japan from manufacturing or possessing nuclear
weapons.204
But those sceptical analyses are based on the assumption that
Japan’s security policy is solely or primarily dictated by external
threat factors. A closer analysis of the history of Japan’s security pol-
icy, however, suggests that it is rather determined by domestic fac-
tors such as the demilitarisation after World War II. Anti-militaristic
attitudes have resulted in inXuential paciWstic and anti-nuclear social
movements. Their persistent strength embodies a dual rejection of
militarism, both at home and abroad.205 Nonetheless, in the view of
many Asian countries, Japan has failed to come to terms with its
imperial past. Furthermore, it questions the Japanese version of a
“cheque-book diplomacy”—buying trust and inXuence of its Asian
neighbours by oVering extensive development aid-funds—that has
obviously produced only limited positive results in this regard. In the
view of its Asia-PaciWc neighbours, without an unambiguous inter-
pretation of its history, the Japanese government and Diet policy will
not be able to stimulate lasting trust and conWdence in its foreign
policies.
Japanese politicians and security experts explain Tokyo’s intention
to commercialise an indigenous plutonium fuel cycle with Japan’s
current dependence on oil imports and the lessons of World War II.
Consequently, Japan is trying to reduce its oil and gas imports from
abroad. The persistence of Japan’s plutonium programme is also
explained by domestic actors such as bureaucratic and industrial
interests. Thus Japan’s nuclear organisations are closely intertwined
with each other that guarantees their self-serving and conservative
bureaucratic interests.206 Additionally to those historical and domestic
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explanations, Japan’s non-proliferation experts argue that Japan is
neither capable to produce hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade
plutonium nor are suYcient numbers of Japanese nuclear scientists
and engineers willing to participate in a nuclear weapons programme.207
Instead of that, Tokyo has opened all of its civilian nuclear power
station activities to IAEA veriWcation. Additionally, since 1994 it has
disclosed speciWc Wgures of its plutonium stocks to increase interna-
tional transparency measures of its nuclear fuel recycling programme.
Those who speculate nonetheless about a future Japanese nuclear
arsenal are in the view of Japan’s experts often not well-informed
about the basic technical means of nuclear armament.208 In their
view, Japan would have to overcome considerable technical and polit-
ical obstacles of immediately going nuclear. For example, it would
need at least seven to eight years to acquire the technology and to
build as well as to deploy nuclear armed submarines.209 Moreover,
given the close nuclear relationship and programmes between the
United States and Japan, Washington still enjoys a considerable lever-
age over Tokyo as result of its on-going technological and material
support.210 It is historically explained by the fact that the US support
of Japan’s civilian nuclear power programmes after World War II
had been seen as a pre-condition to prevent Tokyo from starting a
nuclear weaponisation.211 Nowadays, the following Wve additionally
political reasons speak rather against a future Japanese interest to
acquire a nuclear option:212
(1) it damages Japan’s security environment and prosperity because
it is heavily dependent on energy imports from abroad (1990: 85.4%
of its total energy and 99.7% of its oil consumption). For its eco-
nomic survival, Japan has to rely on safe maritime transportation to
import oil and gas and to export its goods which might be threat-
ened by its own nuclear weaponisation;
and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute ( JAERI), the nuclear suppliers in-
dustry, and electric utilities—see M. Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium programme”, p. 5.
207 See also K. Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella”, p. 48.
208 R. Imai, “Post-Cold War Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Japan”, Japan Review
of International AVairs, Fall 1994, pp. 314–332, p. 322 and Matake Kamiya, “Will
Japan Go Nuclear? Myth and Reality”, pp. 5–19, p. 12f.
209 Matake Kamiya, “Japan and the Bomb”, Look Japan, June 1996, pp. 11–13,
p. 13.
210 M. Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium programme”, p. 5.
211 Ibid., p. 6f.
212 Matake Kamiya, “Will Japan Go Nuclear? Myth and Reality”, pp. 9V. and
id., “Japan and the Bomb”.
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(2) it undermines rather than promotes Japan’s military security,
particularly when China, South Korea, and Taiwan would imple-
ment countermeasures;
(3) it threatens the U.S.-Japanese alliance which is based on a
non-nuclear status of Japan;
(4) it damages Japan’s environment because Japanese nuclear wea-
pons have to be tested. While the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 prohibits atmospheric and underwater explosions, Japan 
has no suitable underground testing sites;213 and
(5) it limits rather than increases Japan’s political inXuence on the
regional and global level.214
However, Japanese security experts would not totally deny a nuclear
weaponisation if Japan’s security environment would rapidly and fun-
damentally change. The following two circumstances are considered
as determining factors for a basic re-assessment of Japan’s current
non-nuclear weapon status: (1) nuclear acquisition programmes by
South Korea, Taiwan and other potential nuclear threshold states
in its vicinity and, simultaneously, (2) a failing function and/or lack-
ing credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan. Only if nuclear
rivals of Japan would force it to make unreasonable, intolerable 
concessions, could a nuclear option thus win broader public and
political support in Japan.215 But even then, only a strong political
government with a considerable political backing in the Diet could
theoretically “re-educate” Japan’s paciWstic society and its aversion
connected with nuclear energy. A strong government is also a pre-
condition to mute likely international criticism for withdrawing from
the NPT-regime and risking a fundamental break with its traditional
foreign policy still based on the Japanese-American security alliance.
Given the turmoil of the political party system of Japan and the
rather weak governments during the last years, such a strong polit-
ical government in Japan seems rather unlikely for the time being.
In the mid—and long-term perspective, however, and regarding
the uncertainties of the future U.S.-Japanese security alliance which
nuclear proliferation 125
213 “On the implications see again F. Umbach, “World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s
Nuclear Blackmail—Part Two”.
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215 The author was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International
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is still the key factor of stability in East Asia, a discussion about
acquiring a nuclear option cannot totally be excluded.216 If Japan’s
security environment in its neighbourhood should indeed drastically
change and further reductions of the U.S.-Japanese forces in Japan
take place, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will further
decline. In addition, for deterring small “rogue states” (like North
Korea) or terrorists attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, the use
of sophisticated conventional armament by the U.S. armed forces—
as demonstrated successfully in the Gulf-War—seems to be the far
more adequate response to that security challenge than to resort
automatically to nuclear weapons.217 But those military-technical and
political-strategic considerations have already undermined the cred-
ibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan and other East Asian
states despite all declarations.218 Against this background and even
more than for Europe, a credible extended deterrence of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella is still vital for East Asia’s stability.
The Ballistic Missile Threat to Japan and Its Impact on
Japan’s Future Defence and Non-Proliferation Policies
In the post-Cold War era, the risks are greatly reduced that Russian
military incursions into Japanese territory might be undertaken to gain
a strategic advantage over the United States. But at the same time,
precisely because Japan has lost its strategic signiWcance as a key par-
ticipant in the strategy of Soviet containment, it is now exposed to
more direct dangers.
(So the Japanese expert Atsumasa Yamamoto in an analysis published
in 1995)219
Until the end of the Cold War, Japan’s foreign and security pol-
icy was based on the three well-known non-nuclear principles. But
they were promulgated as part of the government’s less well-known
216 See also F. Umbach, “The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance”,
in: Manfred Mols/Joern Dosch (Eds.), International Relations in the Asia-PaciWc. New
Patterns of Interest, Power and Cooperation (LIT-Verlag; forthcoming in 2000).
217 See also K. Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella”, p. 48f.
218 To U.S. assurances and bilateral eVorts in the context of the U.S. security
alliance and the new guidelines see Yasuhide Yamanouchi, “Nuclear Energy and
Japan’s Security Policy”, p. 209f.
219 A. Yamamoto, “Ballistic Missile Security Risks Facing Japan”, Asia-PaciWc Review,
Autumn/Winter 1995, pp. 29–51, p. 38.
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four nuclear principles. These four nuclear principles reveal the ambi-
guity of realistic and idealistic objectives of Japan’s security policy.
Besides the (1) adherence of the three non-nuclear principles, (2) pro-
motion of nuclear disarmament and (3) giving highest priority to the
peaceful civilian use of nuclear power, it also included (4) its depend-
ence on the U.S. nuclear deterrence umbrella in accordance with
the U.S.-Japan security alliance.220
This dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella conXicts openly
with Japan’s non-nuclear principles. Nonetheless, Japan’s security
experts still favour traditional arms control instruments of its non-
proliferation policies such as promoting the NPT and CTBT, cre-
ating Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) and demanding a “no-
Wrst-use” policy as well as granting “negative security assurances” by
the Wve nuclear powers to non-nuclear weapons states. Whether
Japan’s traditional three non-nuclear principles of Japan’s diplomacy
are also for the future a suYcient policy instrument for successful non-
proliferation strategies, however, is increasingly debated in Japan
itself. Considering East Asia’s future energy needs as result of their
economic growth and population increase in the region, almost all
countries are looking into the available options, notably the civilian
use of nuclear power. Consequently, there is an urgent need to co-
ordinate their nuclear fuel cycle programmes and outlining plans for
joint fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage, and reprocessing plants for
the entire region221 as proposals for an ASIATOM or PACATOM
indicate. All these civilian nuclear energy programmes, particularly
the creation of additional nuclear storage sites, will raise consider-
able non-proliferation concerns in a region often characterised as
highly insecure.
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Table 7: Theatre Ballistic Missiles Capable of Reaching Japan
Country Name Range (km) Notes
Russia Scud–B/C 300–500 (*)
China Dongfeng–21/CSS–5 1.800 (*)
Dongfeng–3/CSS–2 2.800 Being retired?
Dongfeng–4/CSS–3 4.750 (*)
Dongfeng–21X 3.000 Advanced, longer-range
version of the DF–21,
in development
Dongfeng–25 1.800 In development
Julang–1/CSS–N-3 1.700 SLBM; deployed on 
one or two Xia SSBNs
North Korea Scud C 500–650 (*)
No-Dong–1 1.000 At least 20+ deployed
No-Dong–2 1.500+ in development
Taepo-Dong–1 2.000 Tested in August 1998
Taepo-Dong–2 4.000+ in development
* Deployment details not known.
Frank Umbach, “World Gets Wise to Pyongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail—Part Two”,
Jane’s Intelligence Review ( JIR), October 1999, pp. 35–39, here p. 36.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War (“Operation Desert Storm”) has shown
that those TBMs like the Iraqi Scud-missiles had still a greater psy-
chological impact than destructive power. Given the introduction of
more sophisticated conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear war-
heads in the next years and decades, however, the power of destruc-
tion of those TBMs will rapidly increase. These ballistic missiles
might be particularly destabilising due to their inherent elements of
surprise (short launch and warning time) as well as of limited pos-
sibilities of an early detecting and of eVective countermeasures. Unless
a country threatened by those TBMs has no adequate early-warning
systems for detection and an eVective anti-ballistic missile defence
to neutralise those missiles, it might see no other chance in a severe
crisis than to opt for pre-emptive military options to destroy them
before they are launched. But those pre-emptive military options
would signiWcantly undermine crisis stability and increase the esca-
lation of conXicts in the region. Given Japan’s perceived threat of
ballistic missiles in its vicinity, Tokyo decided to participate in a joint
Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) project, suggested by the United
States, in response to North Korea’s successful 1993 launching of
the Nodong I medium-range missile. Tokyo’s fears have been conWrmed
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during the Taiwan missile crisis in March 1996 when one Chinese
missile accidentally fell into the ocean near Japanese territory.
The joint TMD-option of Japan with the United States, however,
is currently still in the research stage. The United States has oVered
Tokyo several deployment options since 1994, estimating that the
costs—4–17 billion US$—would absorb a considerable portion of
Japan’s defence budget. All options are designated to deploy advanced
TMD-systems in 2004–5 to counter both the Chinese and North
Korean missile threat. A Wnal decision by the Japanese government,
however, is seriously hampered by legal, political, strategic and eco-
nomic considerations. Legal objections result from Japanese law 
and the prohibition of transferring weapon systems or associated
technologies to third countries (like South Korea and Taiwan) or to
deploy space-based components that constitutes a “militarisation of
space”. Other objections have questioned the missile threat to Japan
or have qualiWed the TMD options as overtly hostile in the Chinese
threat perception that might lead to an open arms race between
China and Japan. Indeed, the discussion of TMD systems deployed
in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is driving the modernisation of
China’s nuclear arsenal and particularly of developing a MIRV 
capability.
Instead of a TMD-option, Japanese security experts have proposed
a further internationalisation of the global non-proliferation eVorts.
Those strategies include (1) the creation of a satellite-based interna-
tional veriWcation system to overcome the superpower dominated
sources of information, (2) a multilateral fuel-cycle centre, with facil-
ities to store and processing plutonium discharged from light-water
reactors in East Asia (including those of China, Taiwan, and the
Korean Peninsula), and (3) an extended and deeper security dialogue
with other states or eVective security institutions on a regional and
global level.222 While these strategies are indeed a useful instrument for
promoting regional and global non-proliferation eVorts and CSBMs,
it remains uncertain whether they are able to secure Japan against
an highly uncertain situation on the Korean peninsula and China’s
expanding strategic nuclear forces. Even in the case that the U.S. 
and its major allies in Northeast Asia would stop their plans for
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TMD development and deployment, Beijing’s strategic nuclear force
modernisation would nonetheless continue because of other military-
strategic reasons and probably internal bureaucratic factors as Chinese
experts admit privately.223
Until North Korea’s missile test and attempt to launch a satellite
in August 1998, Japan was largely divided on the TMD-question.
Finally, the sceptical considerations have been conWrmed by North
Korea’s missile test which prompted Tokyo to agree to commit funds
for research and development of a theatre missile defence system,
together with the U.S. Thus North Korea’s test-Wring of its missile
had fundamental security implications for Japan, East Asia and the
future of the U.S. alliances in the region.224
Conclusions and Perspectives
After the end of the Cold War, East Asia faces a number of new
security challenges that have important implications on its future for-
eign, security, defence and non-proliferation policies. In particular
destabilising are nuclear ambitions and ballistic as well as cruise mis-
sile acquisitions.
Until the beginning of 1999, improved bilateral relations between
Washington and Moscow, deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, new
global non-proliferation eVorts, increasing world-wide calls for the
abolition of nuclear weapons, and increased attention as well as high-
tech conventional military options toward regional conXicts, by con-
trast, all seemed to have reduced the deterrent value of nuclear
weapons on the global scale and particularly in the United States
which might also have negative implications for the credibility of
extended deterrence in Northeast Asia. Regrettably, Russian and
Chinese discussions of military doctrine and strategy during the last
years, however, are moving in the opposite direction of eVorts by
the international community towards delegitimizing or even abol-
ishing the utility of nuclear weapons because their conventional armed
forces are no longer or still not able to compete with the over-
223 So the result of discussions the author had during the last three years with
Chinese experts. See also James A. Lamson/Wyn Q. Bowen, “One Arrow, Three
Stars—Part I”, p. 218.
224 On the implications see F. Umbach, “The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
and the Security Implications for Japan and Northeast Asia—Part Two”.
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whelming technological superiority of the U.S. conventional armed
forces. Therefore, a world-wide abolition of nuclear weapons seems
rather unrealistic and impractical for the time being.
Furthermore, another new security challenge has emerged out of
the blue. Compared to West European countries, both the United
States and Japan seemed for a long time rather distant from the
source of international terrorism and smuggling illegal nuclear or
other special mass destruction material. There are several reasons
why not only Japan, but also other East Asian and Western coun-
tries as well as Russia should be concerned about Aum Shinrikyo’s
Sarin nerve gas attack in 1995 as a precedent of a new form of ter-
rorism and fundamental security challenge: (1) the willingness of the
cult leader Asahara and his followers to use mass destruction weapons;
(2) the truly global nature of the terrorist cult; (3) the amount of
intellectual followers including lawyers, oYcers, scientists and engi-
neers; (4) highly sophisticated research and production facilities for
mass destruction weapons; (5) the failing control of Internet provid-
ing sensitive information to the development of mass destruction
weapons and (6) the manifold unpreparedness of Japan and other
high-industrialised countries to the new form of terrorism and secu-
rity challenge. In this light, the timely development of common strate-
gies and appropriate mechanisms and means by the West, Russia,
Japan and other East Asian countries for countering and preventing
the use of non-conventional weaponry by terrorist groups is a condi-
tio qua non for future regional and global stability.
In order to prevent those new security dilemmas and to stabilise
and not to undermine regional and global stability, a much broader
and deeper security co-operation between nuclear powers and non-
nuclear weapon states is urgently needed. Realistically, it should begin
with enhancing and deepening the process for more military trans-
parency. It should include the publication of more detailed White
Papers concerning the national defence policies, comparing detailed
military budgets, military doctrines and strategies, conventional and
nuclear arms procurement plans, and by inviting experts to military
exercises as part of conWdence-building measures. While a wide-rang-
ing and militarily signiWcant nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia
seems only achievable in a long-term process of a nearly nuclear-
free world, a register of nuclear arms in the region would also con-
tribute to more transparency and conWdence-building in the region
in the short—and mid-term perspective.
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Ultimately, the stability in the region will also depend in the fore-
seeable future on a strong and sustained engagement policy by the
United States which encloses substantial political, economic and mil-
itary means. In this light, the linchpin for stability in the Asia-PaciWc
region as well as for Japan’s security and the maintenance of its non-
nuclear weapon status remains the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In
this light, maintaining and deepening of the U.S.-Japanese security
alliance—as it was agreed in the spring of 1996—and with that the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is still the fundamental pre-
requisite and pre-condition not only for Japan’s security and its future
non-nuclear weapon status, but also for its Asian neighbours and
their trust against a resurgence of a perceived Japanese military
expansionism or a hostile bilateral relationship between Japan and
China. But the Japanese society and government must realise and
accept—as one of its security experts has concluded—that it “can-
not aVord to have the United States and other countries assume all
responsibilities, because what is really at stake is Japan’s own secu-
rity. Japan cannot refuse to share the risk.”225
Therefore, Japan and its bureaucratic elite have to take over new
security obligations and responsibilities as well as to initiate a broader
as well as more open security debate with its public in order to bol-
ster new directions of its foreign and security policies. Given the last-
ing mistrust of its Asian neighbours, Japan can only assume new
regional responsibilities in a close alliance with the United States
that also reassures the other East Asian states. Although the bilat-
eral Japan-U.S. partnership was, is and will not necessarily be always
without some tensions, the security alliance between both states
remains the essential political, defence and economic pillar for the
entire Asian-PaciWc region on which all the other bilateral and multi-
lateral relationships will depend in the foreseeable future.226 Given
China’s rather suspicious perception of the now enlarged U.S.-Japanese
security alliance, diplomatically the most diYcult task for both states
remains to change the Chinese view of this alliance as another instru-
ment to contain China. This is, indeed a Hercules-task, but there is
225 Atsumasa Yamamoto, “Ballistic Missile Security Risks Facing Japan”, p. 45.
226 See also F. Umbach, “The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance”,
in: Manfred Mols/Joern Dosch (Eds.), International Relations in the Asia-PaciWc. New
Patterns of Interest, Power and Co-operation (LIT-Verlag; forthcoming in 1999).
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realistically no other way ahead for Japan, the United States as well
as for the EU if one considers the entire strategic environment of
the Asia-PaciWc region: Engagement where ever it is possible and
containment when it is needed should be the primary guide of our
strategic policies vis-à-vis China.
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